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The Law Through A Looking Glass:
Our Supreme Court and the Use and
Abuse of the California Declaration of
Rights
Ira Reiner* and George Glenn Size*
Our California Declaration of Rights, Article I of the California
Constitution,' has been the subject of continuing interest and
increasing controversy in recent decades. Unfortunately, the
controversy has not been accompanied by a critical study of the
history of that document, and of the sources underlying it. Such
attention as has been given to this subject has largely been in
service of the "adequate and independent state grounds" doctrine.
Supporters of this doctrine, as it emerged in the 1970's, advocated
interpretation of the California Constitution--and particularly of the
Declaration--so as to depart from the requirements of the United
States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court. The most consequential application of this doctrine has been
to extend to defendants in criminal cases procedural rights which
are more expansive than those mandated by the United States Bill
District Attorney of Los Angeles County; B.S., University of Southern California, 1959;
J.D., Southwestern University School of Law, 1964.
** Deputy District Attorney, Appellate Division, Los Angeles District Attorneys Office; A.B.,
Princeton University, 1975; A.M., Harvard University, 1978; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1982.
Certain portions of this Article were previously submitted to the California Supreme Court in
an amicus brief on behalf of the California District Attorneys' Association in Bowens v. Superior
Court, 1 Cal. 4th 36, 820 P.2d 600, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376 (1991).
The authors gratefully acknowledge the advice of members of the Appellate Division of our
Office, and particularly the editorial assistance of Richard E. Nusbaum, law clerk, without whose
diligent efforts this Article would not have been published. Any errors are, of course, the
responsibility of the authors. On the other hand, whatever errors we may have made, we are-as shall
appear below-in fine company.
1. The text of the original 1849 Declaration is set forth in Appendix 1, infra.
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of Rights. Since the point of the independent state grounds doctrine
is to depart from federal precedents as persuasive authority for
California law, it is not surprising that the emphasis in both the
California high court's opinions and in scholarly comment has been
on the distance between the California Declaration from the federal
charter. In recent years, in fact, some have gone so far as to deny
that our California Declaration was based upon the federal
constitution at all.
As the California Supreme Court availed itself of "independent
state grounds" with increasing frequency to extend more and more
rights to criminal defendants, a confrontation developed between
the court and the people of California at the polls. Initially, the
point of dispute was the death penalty, which the court attempted
to abolish in 1972, relying upon the Declaration of Rights. Even
when this attempt was overturned by popular vote in 1974, the
court, if anything, accelerated its program of relying upon the
Declaration of Rights to avoid federal precedents, most notably in
regard to the exclusionary rule. This movement in turn engendered
increasing popular frustration which erupted in 1982 in the first
great climax of this period: Proposition 8, and particularly its
Truth-in-Evidence provision which mandated that the exclusionary
rule be interpreted according to federal norms. Far from ending the
issue, Proposition 8 signaled a heightened level of suspicion and
hostility between the court and the voters. This growing antagonism
culminated in 1986 with the removal of three justices from the
bench and in 1990 with the passage of Proposition 115, the Crime
Victims Justice Reform Act, which, among other things, sought to
require the court to hue to federal law on a whole range of criminal
procedural issues. The court struck down that provision of
Proposition 115 in 1991--and already there is talk of more
initiatives to come.
This confrontation has left this state and the state supreme court
in a long-simmering constitutional dispute. In this Article, we
consider both the early history of the California Declaration of
Rights and the use that has been made of it in the last couple of
decades. In Part I of the Article, we address the arguments of those
who have contended that the drafters of the California Declaration
1184
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relied upon the constitutions of other states, rather than upon the
federal constitution, and who seek to use this to justify departing
from federal precedent.2 We conclude that both the text and
history of the Declaration demonstrate that most of the important
criminal law provisions were taken from the United States
Constitution and were adopted into our state Declaration precisely
in order to secure the rights of the federal constitution to
Californians. In Part II, we review the recent history of the use of
the independent state grounds doctrine by the California Supreme
Court to depart from federal authority--and recent popular
initiatives which have reversed many of those departures.3 In light
of the history of the Declaration, these recent initiatives directed at
"federalizing" criminal procedure, such as Propositions 8 and 115,
appear less as assaults upon the "independent vitality" of the
Declaration, as such, than as reminders to the judiciary of what the
people of this State, both in constitutional conventions and at the
ballot box, have long regarded as the true purpose of most of the
criminal provisions of the Declaration of Rights.4
PART I
THE TEXT AND HISTORY OF THE CALIFORNIA
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
A. Introduction
Before beginning our review of the historical sources of the
Declaration, we should mention two caveats at the outset. First,
although we have made some effort to trace the provenance of each
of the provisions of our original Declaration of Rights,5 our own
focus is very much upon those provisions most salient to the
criminal law. We will attempt to remind the reader of this focus
2. See infra notes 5-129 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 130-240 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 241-248 and accompanying text.
5. See infra Appendix I (setting forth the text and history of the original 1849 Declaration).
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periodically, but he or she should bear in mind that, unless the
context clearly indicates otherwise, our observations are directed to
the criminal provisions of the Declaration, only. Second, our review
of the history of the Declaration is obviously intended for those for
whom the text and history of the constitution are of genuine
interest. Those for whom the texts of state and federal constitutions
are little more than opportunities for "policy making" or for whom
"all law is ideology" will remain unmoved. But, we doubt, for
example, that any California Supreme Court justice who has sat on
that bench during the past two or three controversial decades would
deny the centrality of the text and history of the state constitution
to their work. As Professor Leonard Levy--himself a prominent
skeptic of the "original intent" school--has eloquently remarked,
in the federal context:
Excepting the scholarly theorists who want the [United States Supreme]
Court to reach results of which they approve, no matter whether related
to what the Constitution says or what it meant to its Framers, most
scholars and probably all judges believe that the task of judging should
be as impersonal and objective as humanly possible.
6
We certainly do not deny the independent power of our state
supreme court to depart from the jurisprudence of the United States
Supreme Court in its interpretation of parallel state/federal
provisions. Nor do we contend that the "original intent" of the
drafters of the state constitution requires courts to reach particular
results. Nor, again, do we believe that identical wording must
always be interpreted identically. We do contend that the drafters'
intent, the language of the text and its history should seriously
6. L LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 373 (1988) [hereinafter
LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT]. Professor Levy goes on:
In constitutional cases, as in any others, the judge who first chooses what the
outcome should be and then reasons backward to supply a rationalization replete with
rules and precedents has betrayed his calling; he has decided on the basis of prejudice or
prejudgment, and he has made constitutional law little more than the embodiment of his
policy preferences, reflecting his personal predilections. Result-oriented jurisprudence,
whether liberal or conservative, is a gross abuse of judicial office.
Id Nor, we might add, does it generally achieve the sought-after result-not in California, anyway.
See infra Part II, passim.
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inform and restrain the proper interpretation of our state
constitution.
B. The Origins of Our Present Declaration of Rights in the 1849
Constitution
Most of the provisions of our present California Declaration of
Rights go back to our original state constitution, drafted in
Monterey in 1849.' This is particularly true of the protections most
relevant to criminal law and procedure. Although significant
changes were made to the jury trial and the grand jury provisions
when California adopted its second constitution in 1879, for the
most part the delegates to the 1879 convention were satisfied to
adopt the provisions of the first constitution. Furthermore, although
recent decades have witnessed stylistic revisions and a few
substantive changes,8 the core of the Declaration remains very
much as it was originally drafted in 1849.' In seeking the
provenance of and intentions underlying the Declaration, therefore,
the most important sources--in addition to the text itself--are the
debates of the 1849 Monterey convention, supplemented by those
of the 1879 convention.
The traditional history has long held that the California
Declaration of Rights was, as a general matter, created by grafting
together portions of the bills of rights of two other states--i.e., that
7. See Appendix I, where we set forth our own provisional conclusions with regard to the
provenance and subsequent history of the provisions, both criminal and otherwise, of the 1849
Declaration. In the Appendix, we avoid speaking of the "origins" of provisions or phrases, both
because these are often very difficult to determine, and because the issue is not the ultimate origin
of a text but the sources to which the drafters looked as authoritative models and what these may
reasonably tell us about what they had in mind by adopting-or rejecting-such provisions or phrases.
Therefore, we use the word "archetype" to represent the authoritative fount of a textual tradition in
question, as it was regarded by the constitutional drafters. Where direct evidence is lacking, we may
surmise the probable archetype. On the other hand, by referring to "ostensible sources" we mean
the exemplar or "witness" from which the drafters directly worked. In such circumstances, it is to
be expected that, where the ostensible sources depart from the archetype, the archetype-to the extent
it was regarded as possessed of greater authority-will prevail, and the language of the exemplar will
be emended to agree with the archetype, except in purely stylistic respects. See, e.g., our discussion
of the California search and seizure provision, infra at part I.D.2.
8. See discussion infra Part ll.C.
9. See infra Appendix I.
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the first eight sections of the Declaration had been taken from the
constitution of New York and the others were from the constitution
of Iowa.10 The source of this account was an assertion by one of
the most influential delegates at the convention, Mr. William M.
Gwin, made during the opening days of the 1849 convention."
With barely a single notable exception, 2 the sources
underlying the Declaration hardly witnessed a systematic treatment
until the past few years with the publication of Professor Christian
G. Fritz's article in the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly in
10. At best, authors may acknowledge general and unspecified departures from these models.
See, e.g., 2 T. HITTEIT, HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA 758 (1897); N. HARLOW, CALIFORNIA CONQUERED:
TIm ANNEXATION OF A MEXICAN PROVINCE, 1846-1850, at 342 (1982) [hereinafter, HARLOW,
CALIFORNA CONQUERED] (references to origin of Declaration in Iowa and New York constitutions);
6 H. BANcRoFF, HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA 296 (1888); David, Our California Constitutions:
Retrospections In This Bicentennial Year, 3 HASTINOS CONST. L.Q. 697, 712-13 (1976). See also R.
CLELAND, A HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA: THE AMERICAN PERIOD 252-53 (1923); W. BEAN AND J.
RAWLS, CALIFORNIA: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY 99 (1988) [hereinafter, BEAN AND RAWLS,
CALIFORNIA] (references to Iowa and New York constitutions as sources for California Constitution).
11. Immediately following the initial reading of a draft of the Declaration by the chairman of
the Standing Committee on the Constitution, Mr. Myron Norton, the Report of the Debates records
that Mr. Gwin offered a resolution regarding consideration and printing of the proposals:
With regard to this resolution, Mr. Gwin would merely state that the first eight sections
of the report submitted by the chairman of the Select Committee, were from the
Constitution of New York; all the others were from the Constitution of Iowa. There were
several manuscript copies of the first part, and printed copies of the last, which would
enable the Convention to proceed to business at the hour designated,
J. BROWNE, REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA, ON THE FORMATION OF
TH STATE CONSTITUTION, IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, 1849, at 31 (1850) [hereinafter BROWNE,
1849 DEBATES]. Mr. Gwin, formerly a member of the House of Representatives, had brought to the
convention copies of the Iowa Constitution of 1846, which he distributed to the delegates and
advocated as a model for the California Constitution. HARLOW, CALIFORNIA CONQUERED, supra note
10, at 341. Cf., R. HUNT, THE GENESIS OF CALIFORNIA'S FIRST CONsTITUTION (1846-49), at 56 n.3
(1895) (who almost a century ago expressly pointed out the error of taking Gwin's remark at face
value).
12. In 1879, only six months after the conclusion of the constitutional convention of that year,
Mr. Robert Desty published THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA ADOPTED IN 1879
WITH REFERENCES TO SIMILAR PROVISIONS IN THE CONSTITUTIONS OF OTHER STATES in November,
1879. It is often described in research library indices merely as a "'handbook" of the convention, and
no doubt accordingly passed by. Mr. Desty traces parallel provisions in other states' constitutions,
and in the federal constitution. Unfortunately, he was apparently left bereft of intellectual heirs, to
the point that modem scholars have found it necessary to reconstruct the origins of the constitution
ab initio. See P. MASON, CONSTITUTION OF THE CALIFORNIA ANNOTATED 1403-25 (1946) (for a
much later, and less inspired effort).
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1989, which he quite candidly and properly characterized as
"preliminary.," 3
Most of the other information regarding the origins of the
Declaration has taken the form of general historical studies or
anecdotal inquiries into particular legal issues. The latter have often
consisted of California Supreme Court opinions, the questionable
accuracy of which is a major theme of this Article. The purpose of
Part I.D and I.E, below, is to examine each of the criminal
provisions of the Declaration of Rights in turn.' In Part I.D, we
consider those which were demonstrably taken from federal
sources, usually the United States Bill of Rights. We start with the
"criminal safeguards" provision which includes many of the most
frequently applicable criminal rights (including right to counsel,
due process, jeopardy, etc.) 5 and use this as an opportunity to
address the claims of one of the more prominent arguments
advanced in recent years in support of reliance upon "independent
state grounds." We then proceed to consider the other provisions
13. Fritz, More than "Shreds and Patches": California's First Bill of Rights, 17 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 13, 15 and passim (1989). See 1 W. SwtNDLF, SOURCES AND DOCUMENT'S OF U.S.
CONsTrrriONs 460-61 (1973) (specifying Iowan and federal origins of certain provisions). Our paper
is certainly also preliminary and provisional. It is intended as a contribution to a task too long
delayed: Much work remains to be done on the text and history of the California Constitution.
14. Some explanation is called for as to why certain of the provisions of the Declaration have
not been included here as 'criminal provisions." Virtually any of the sections of the Declaration may
implicate criminal liability under certain circumstances. As a general matter, the religion clause is not
a criminal provision. However, hate crimes certainly infringe upon the rights of individuals to practice
freedom of worship. There are also some provisions which might have had some significant potential
with regard to criminal procedure, but have not realized that potential. An example is the very first
section of the Declaration which provides that: "All people are by nature free and independent and
have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring,
possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 1. This language, which certainly recalls much of the sweeping invocation of rights
in the federal Declaration of Independence, has been essentially a dead letter for at least half a
century (except for the 1972 amendment adding -and privacy" to the end of the provision). See Text
of Proposed Law, in CAL. BALLOT PAMPHLeT 26 (Nov. 7, 1972). Before that, it was used largely to
strike down economic legislation, etc., during the Lochner era. See In re Scaranino, 7 Cal. 2d 309,
60 P.2d 288 (1936) (blue law legislation); In re Smith, 193 Cal. 337, 223 P. 971 (1924) (statute
limiting employment agency fees); In re McCapes, 157 Cal. 26, 106 P. 229 (1909) (ban on burning
brush on private property); Ex Parte Drexel, 147 Cal. 763, 82 P. 429 (1905) (anti-trading stamp act);
Ex Parte Hayden, 147 Cal. 649, 82 P. 315 (1905) (act requiring labeling of fruit); Ex Parte Jentzsch,
112 Cal. 468, 44 P. 803 (1896) (blue law legislation).
15. See infra notes 30-55 and accompanying text.
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of federal origin, search and seizure, habeas corpus, etc. In Part I.E,
we consider those criminal provisions of the Declaration which
depart from--or are altogether independent of--the federal
constitution and consider the recent fate of those provisions before
the California Supreme Court.
In order to alleviate confusion, we have ordered each section
according to the following chart, numbered in order and describing
the provision considered, its original section in the Declaration,
6
and the present location of the provision:
Section of Text and Subject 1849 Const. Present
Matter Article I Const.
D.1 Criminal Safeguards Sec. 8 Sees. 7(a), 14
& 15
D.2 Search & Seizure Sec. 19 Sec. 13
D.3 Habeas Corpus Sec. 5 Sec. 11
D.4 Bills of Attainder and Ex Post Sec. 16 Sec. 9
Facto Laws
D.5 Bail and Cruel or Unusual Sees. 6 & 7 Sees. 10[1],
Punishments 12 & 17
D.6 Treason Sec. 20 See. 18
E.1 Right to Jury Trial See. 3 Sec. 16
E.2 Alternative Prosecution by Sec. 8 Secs. 14[1],
Indictment or Information (1879 Const.) 14.1 & 23
Before beginning a systematic exposition, though, it is
necessary to disabuse ourselves of some of the more extreme--and
extremely wrong-headed--views regarding the "independent
origins" of our state Declaration of Rights.
1190
16. In all cases but one, the grand jury provision, the original section appeared in the 1849
Declaration.
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C. Apocryphal History: The Theory of Separate State Origins
There can be no doubt that the delegates who gathered in
Monterey in 1849 paid great attention to the constitutions of other
states.17 It would have been remarkable had they done otherwise.
They were, after all, drafting a state constitution. In many respects,
the states have different structures and different priorities and
limitations than does the federal government. Particularly in the
nineteenth century, the federal government focussed upon such
matters as defense and foreign affairs; whereas, the states were (to
an increasing degree as decades passed) concerned with public
education and regulation of industry. On the other hand, there
certainly were areas in which the interests of California delegates
were very similar to those of their federal counterparts. Criminal
rights were one such area. In fact, in order to understand the nature
of the task of drafting a state bill of rights during this period, it is
crucial to remember that the federal Bill of Rights did not then
apply to the states--as held in Barron v. Baltimore.8 Therefore,
the only way that such rights could be secured for citizens of the
states vis-A-vis their state governments was by putting those rights
into the state constitutions, themselves.
The basic principle that the drafters of our state constitution
looked carefully at other state constitutions in doing their work is
therefore not in dispute. Unfortunately, in California this notion has
recently been transmogrified into a grand claim that the drafters of
our constitution relied on other states' constitutions instead of the
United States Constitution--that the state constitutions trace their
histories back through earlier state constitutions predating the
United States Constitution, so that they may lay claim upon priority
to, and therefore independence of, the United States Constitution
and Bill of Rights. This allegedly separate genealogy has then been
used to justify departures from federal interpretations of the United
States Bill of Rights on the grounds that our California Declaration
17. At least by the mid-point in the convention the delegates had all 30 of the then-existing
state constitutions. See BRoWNE, 1849 DEBATm, supra note 11, at 36.
18. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
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of Rights has separate--and, indeed, older--intellectual origins than
do the first ten amendments to the United States Constitution.
The most prominent proponent of this particular version of the
origins of the state charter has been former California Supreme
Court Justice Joseph Grodin, both in his roles as Justice and, more
recently, as law professor. As far as we can discover, the first
public appearance of Justice Grodin's argument, not yet fully
fledged, is in his opinion for the supreme court in People v.
Houston.9 In that case, the California court declined to follow the
United States Supreme Court's very recent decision in Moran v.
Burbine,20 concerning the right of defense counsel to see a suspect
who has waived his Miranda rights. Much of the opinion of the
court consists of a series of exchanges between Justice Grodin, and
Justice (now, Chief Justice) Lucas, in dissent. For his part, Justice
Lucas objected that:
As a general rule, I take exception to basing holdings such as this on
independent state constitutional grounds where the language of the
applicable provisions is almost identical to the federal Constitution, and
without some greater showing of an independent state interest needing
additional protection.
2
1
In response, Justice Grodin pauses at one point and drops the
following footnote:
The debates at the constitutional convention of 1849 make quite clear
that the language of the Declaration of Rights which comprises article
I of the California Constitution was not based upon the federal charter
at all, but upon the constitutions of other states. (Reports of the Debates
in the Convention of Cal. on the Formation of the State Const .... ,
Sept. 7, 1849, at p. 31.) When the 1849 constitution was adopted, of
course, the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution, by which
certain federal constitutional rights have been applied to the states, did
not yet exist. Indeed, a reading of both the 1849 and 1878 constitutional
debates reflects a common understanding that it was the state
19. 42 Cal. 3d 595, 724 P.2d 1166, 230 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1986).
20. 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
21. Houston, 42 Cal. 3d at 624,724 P.2d at 1185,230 Cal. Rptr. at 159 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
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constitution, and not the federal, which would protect the rights of
California citizens against arbitrary action by the state. (See Debates &
Proceedings, Cal. Const. Convention 1878-1879, p. 240; 1849 Debates,
Sept. 7-8, 1849, at pp. 30-42.) Thus, we cannot accept Justice Lucas's
suggestion that state courts should generally adhere to federal precedent
when interpreting state constitutions unless, in his ambiguous phrase,
there is "some greater showing of independent state interest needing
additional protection .... 22
In 1987, Justice Grodin, after leaving the court, set forth this
argument again, in more detailed and mature form, in a speech to
the American Judicature Society at the national convention of the
ABA. The next year this speech formed the basis of a commentary
in the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly.23 After a brief
synopsis of the events of the first California constitutional
convention of 1849, the Justice put forward the argument as
follows:
[F]or the reader interested in the relationship between the California and
federal Constitutions, the debate [at the constitutional convention]
vividly illustrates two important lessons.
The first lesson is that the language of the California Declaration of
Rights was deliberately drawn from the constitutions of other states, not
from the language of the federal Constitution. Despite the frequent use
of language similar and indee4 in some cases, identical to the federal
Bill of Rights, the delegates were not looking to the federal Constitution
as their model. The constitution of New York, which formed the basis
for roughly half of the language, was adopted before the federal
Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. [Footnote omitted.] The
constitution of Iowa, though adopted after the federal Convention, was
an equally independent document. [Footnote omitted.]
The second lesson is that, just as the framers of the California
Constitution were not looking to the federal Constitution as a model for
1193
22. Itd at 609 n.13, 724 P.2d at 1174 n.13, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 149 n.13 (first emphasis added,
others in original).
23. Grodin, Some Reflections on State Constitutions, 15 HAsTiNGs CONST. L.Q. 391,391-402
(1988) [hereinafter Grodin, Some Reflections].
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drafting, neither were they looking to it as a legal basis for protecting
rights and liberties from interference by the new state.
2 4
As noted, Justice Grodin appends two footnotes in the course
of his account, the first of which states: "The New York
Constitution was adopted in 1777. The Federal Constitutional
Convention convened in Philadephia [sic] in May 1787; the
document was ratified in 1788." '  The clear implication is that
the delegates at California's 1849 convention were drawing upon
provisions of the New York Constitution of 1777, which could not
have been based upon the federal constitution because it was
written before the federal Bill of Rights. Or, as Justice Grodin put
it in 1989 in his memoir, In Pursuit of Justice: Reflections of a
State Supreme Court Justice:21 "The constitution of New York,
which formed the basis for roughly half the language of article 1
[the Declaration of Rights], was adopted before the federal
constitutional convention in Philadelphia." 27 In his book, Justice
Grodin goes on to conclude that:
The California constitution is of course not unique.. . . Every state
constitution has its roots in the early state constitutions that preceded the
[federal] Bill of Rights, and in that historical sense every state
constitution is independent of the federal Constitution....
24. Id at 395 (emphasis added).
25. Id. at 395 n.32.
26. GRODIN, IN PURsUIT OF JUSTICE: REFLECTIONS OF A STATE SUPREME COURT JUSTICE
121-22 (1989) [hereinafter GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE].
27. Id at 121.
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The implication of this independence is of tremendous importance to the
law. It means that citizens may have greater rights in some respects
under the constitution of their state than under the federal Constitution.
28
As convincing as this account may sound, it is simply incorrect.
It leads one away from the real sources of the criminal provisions
of the California Declaration of Rights, rather than towards those
sources.
In the first place, the New York Constitution of 1777,29 which
certainly does pre-date the federal constitutional convention (to say
nothing of the Bill of Rights), was definitely not "the basis for
roughly half the language of article 1." In fact, it provides almost
no support for Justice Grodin's expansive claims. One will look in
vain for mention of most of the Declaration's provisions (at least
expressed in anything resembling the language of the California
Constitution) in the New York Constitution of 1777. There is no
mention of a right not to be "compelled, in any criminal case,..
* to be a witness against himself," nor is there any reference to
"due process of law." Neither the word "jeopardy," nor the
concept in some other guise, can be found. There is no habeas
corpus provision, such as is embodied in section 5 of our 1849
Declaration. There is no guarantee against "excessive bail," or
28. Id4 at 122 (emphasis added). Of course, it may also follow that citizens have fewer or
narrower rights under the state constitution, than under the federal constitution-a fact too little
appreciated and seldom acknowledged by advocates of the "independent state grounds" approach.
As a practical matter, it may often (though by no means always) be the case that, even if a court
concludes that the state provision is narrower than the federal one, the state may be required to apply
the federal right, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause. On the other hand, even this notion of the
federal constitution as a 'floor" has often been misunderstood or exaggerated. See Maltz, Lockstep
Analysis and the Concept of Federalism, 496 ANNALS 98, 102-03 (1988) [hereinafter Maltz,
Federalism]; Maltz, The Dark Side of State Court Activism, 63 Tax. L. REV. 995, 1007-11 (1985)
[hereinafter Maltz, The Dark Side] (making this point).
29. 7 W. SWINDLER, SouRcEs AND DOCUMENTS OF U.S. CONSTITUTIONS 168-80 (1978). See
B. POORE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSrTITIONS, part II, at 1328-40 (2nd ed. reprint 1972) (text
of 1777 constitution); N. CARTER AND W. STONE, REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF
THE CONVENTION OF 1821, at 2-21 (Albany 1821) [hereinafter NEw YORK DEBATES OF 1821]
(reproducing the 1777 constitution).
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"excessive fines" and no prohibition of "cruel" and/or "unusual
punishments," as set forth in section 6. The New York document
does not speak of "the liberty of speech or of the press," as does
our article I, section 9. There is a right to jury trial, but it is not
expressed in language such as in our Declaration. In fact, of those
provisions which supposedly originated in the New York
Constitution, only most of one section and one clause of another in
the 1777 constitution display language closely parallel to the 1849
California Declaration of Rights (or, for that matter, to the present
Declaration): the religion clause, which is section 4 of the 1849
Declaration; and the clause stating that a "party . . . shall be
allowed counsel, as in civil actions."
The explanation of all this is simple: Justice Grodin is speaking
and writing as if there were a single New York constitution, when
in fact there were three during the period at issue: the constitutions
of 1777, 1821 and 1846. The delegates to the constitutional
convention in Monterey were working from the New York
Constitution of 1846, which resembles the New York Constitution
of 1777 only somewhat more than the United States Constitution
resembles the federal Declaration of Independence. The analogy is
actually a relatively apt one, because the 1777 constitution is the
New York "declaration of independence." The first portion of the
document recounts the reasons for dissatisfaction with the British
crown and actually incorporates by quotation the Declaration of
Independence of July 4, 1776. Most of the rest of the document
consists of fifty-two provisions relating, in large part, to the more
mundane requirements of setting up an independent government:
the duties of state officials, powers of the legislature, appointment
of officials, conditions for impeachment, etc. There is no
"declaration" or "bill of rights," as such, in the 1777 New York
Constitution.
New Yorkers relatively soon (at least by constitutional
standards) found it advisable to draft a new constitution. This they
did in Albany, in 1821. Of course, there was also a second
motivation recommending the drafting of a new constitution. The
Constitution of the United States of America had been ratified in
1787 and its first ten amendments, the federal Bill of Rights,
1196
1992 / Use and Abuse of the California Declaration of Rights
adopted in 1791. That was about thirty years before the drafting of
New York's first true bill of rights, which is article VII of its 1821
constitution. This constitution was in turn subject to redrafting at
the New York constitutional convention of 1846. In order to
appreciate the intellectual origins of our California Declaration of
Rights, it is necessary to understand, first, that it was the 1846 New
York Constitution (being then quite up-to-date) which our delegates
were looking at in Monterey in 1849. Second, the provisions of the
1846 bill of rights for the most part trace their language to the
1821 constitution. Third, as already noted, as far as criminal rights
are concerned, the great bulk of constitutional guarantees traceable
to the 1821 constitution were in their turn taken from the United
States Constitution, as were several provisions taken from the Iowa
Constitution of 1846. And fourth, the delegates at our 1849
convention knew full well that they were adopting provisions which
in fact came from the United States Constitution and adopted them
in large part precisely for that reason.
D. The Federal Origins of the Major Criminal Provisions of the
Declaration
1. The Criminal Safeguards Provision
We illustrate our conclusions in this regard by beginning with
the so-called "criminal safeguards" provision, which was
embodied in section 8 of the 1849 Declaration and in section 13 of
the 1879 version. This provision has, since its origin, included
many of the most fundamental constitutional rights in criminal law.
As set forth in the 1849 constitution, it provided that:
Sec. 8. No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise
infamous crime, (except in cases of impeachment, and in cases of
militia when in actual service, and the land and naval forces in time of
war, or which this State may keep with the consent of Congress in time
of peace, and in cases of petit larceny under the regulation of the
Legislature) unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury; and
in any trial in any court whatever, the party accused shall be allowed to
appear and defend in person and with counsel, as in civil actions. No
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person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offence;
nor shall he be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation.
30
In 1879, the proyisions for grand jury indictment were changed,
and the right to a speedy trial, compulsory process and other rights
were added, as discussed below. 31 Although now somewhat
dispersed, the individual provisions of the criminal safeguards
provision, as adopted in 1849 and amended in 1879, remain
integral parts of the California Declaration. Because the criminal
safeguards provision contains so many of those rights which
commonly impact upon criminal cases, we use it as an exemplar
for the origins of the criminal provisions of the Declaration,
although we do not rest our thesis upon that provision alone.
The language of the criminal safeguards provision in the 1849
California Constitution is identical to that of the New York
Constitution of 1846, being section 6 of Article I, the bill of rights
of that document.32 That language was itself very similar to that of
the New York Constitution of 1821, Article VII, section 7, with a
few changes in the later document, as set forth in the margin.33
30. 1 W. SwINDLER, supra note 13, at 447-48. In comparing the various constitutions, we
have generally ignored minor differences in punctuation and capitalization. These habits of
orthography vary from decade to decade and document to document. For example, the use of commas
and semi-colons varies between the original articles of the constitution and the final engrossed
version. See Bowman, The Original Constitution of 1849, 28 CALIFORNIA HISTORICAL SocIEry
QUARTERLY, no. 3, at 193, 194-95 (1949). For no pressing reason, we have used the spelling,
punctuation and capitalization set forth in the final draft of the original constitution. See CALIFORNIA
STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND THE CALIFORNIA STATE ARCHIVES, THE ORIGINAL OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF TE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 1849 (1965) [hereinafter THE ORIGINAL
CoNSTIIoN].
31. See infra text accompanying notes 45-47.
32. See 7 W. SwINDLER, supra note 29, at 192-93; B. POORE, supra note 29, at 1351.
33. We reprint here the language of the New York Constitution of 1846, italicizing only the
words which were not taken from article VII, section 7 of the 1821 constitution and striking out those
which were eliminated from the earlier document:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, (except in
cases of impeachment, and in cases of the militia when in actual service; and the land and
naval forces in time of war, or which this State may keep, with the consent of Congress,
in time of peace, and in cases of petit larceny, under the regulation of the legislature,)
unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury; and in eveq any trial en
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This brings us to our second point with regard to Justice
Grodin's argument: the statement that "[e]very state constitution
has its roots in the early state constitutions that preceded the Bill
of Rights, and in that historical sense every state constitution is
independent of the federal Constitution." 34 We do not pretend to
have knowledge of "[e]very state constitution;" we are concerned
here with the California Declaration of Rights, and, secondarily,
with those provisions which California adopted from New York.
What we can say is that neither the criminal provisions of the
California Declaration of Rights, nor those of the New York bills
of rights of 1821 or 1846 support Justice Grodin's statement. On
the contrary, both the California and New York provisions are
"rooted in" the Constitution of the United States, as set forth
below. The evidence for this is in those documents' texts and
histories, especially in the records of the debates at the respective
constitutional conventions.
With regard to those records, we also cannot agree with Justice
Grodin that "[t]he debates at the constitutional convention of 1849
make quite clear that the language of the Declaration of Rights
which comprises article I of the California Constitution was not
based upon the federal charter at all .... ", In point of fact, the
debates show that the delegates, being well aware that the federal
constitution did not then apply to the states,3" in large measure
i.p. ..m t me : t.n.t in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to
appear and defend in person and with counsel as in civil actions. No person shall be
subject fcr the zaemz effence to be twice put in jeopardy of Efe er 9mb for the same
offence; nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use without just compensation.
See 7 W. SWINDLER, supra note 29, at 187, 192-93. For a possible explanation of the elimination of
the "'life or limb" language by the New York constitutional convention of 1846, compare the
colloquy regarding the same phrase at the 1821 convention. See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying
text. In addition, the 1846 section seems to differ from the 1821 provision in guaranteeing the
defendant a right to "appear and defend" in person and to extend this right and right of counsel to
"any court whatever." 7 W. SwINDLER, supra note 29, at 187, 192.
34. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 122.
35. People v. Houston, 42 Cal. 3d 595, 609 n.13, 724 P.2d 1166, 1174 n.13, 230 Cal. Rptr.
141, 149 n.13 (1986).
36. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
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dealt with this problem precisely by adopting the protections of the
federal Bill of Rights into their own charter.
The provenance of the criminal safeguards provision is clearly
reflected in the Debates of the 1849 convention. The Chairman of
the Standing Committee on the Constitution, Mr. Myron Norton of
San Francisco, speaking after the criminal safeguards section was
adopted at the convention, first refers to the safeguards provision
and then offers an amendment. The following colloquy ensues:
MR. NORTON. I have another section which I desire to propose in
connection with the section just adopted [referring to the criminal
safeguards provision]. That section is from the Constitution of the
United States. The section which I propose is also from the Constitution
of the United States, next to it. The first says:
[There follows a quotation of the safeguards provision, in full.]
This does not cover the whole ground; it does not say that he shall have
counsel, or that he shall be confronted by two witnesses on compulsory
process.... The additional section which I propose is as follows:
"In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the district
or county wherein the crime shall have been committed; and
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
assistance of counsel in his defence."
37
There can of course be no doubt about the source of Chairman
Norton's proposal--the Sixth Amendment of the United States Bill
of Rights." Upon completing his proposal, Chairman Norton is
37. BROWN, 1849 DEBAT's, supra note 11, at 293-94 (emphasis added).
38. The Sixth Amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
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immediately confronted with the following objection from two
other delegates:
MR. SHERWOOD. I think the Legislature would adopt this without any
constitutional provision. We are descending too much into detail.
MR. PRICE. It seems to me that we now have more sections in the Bill
of Rights than any other State in the Union; and, without giving proper
time for reflection, I think it would be inexpedient to introduce this new
section in this hurried way. I hope no more new sections will be added.
I would greatly prefer striking out some that are already in the Bill of
Rights; for instance, all that are literally from the Constitution from the
United States. The people know where to find them if they desire to
refer to them. There is no occasion to have them in the Constitution of
California.
39
To this objection, Chairman Norton responded trenchantly,
explaining the purpose of incorporating rights already in the federal
constitution into the California Constitution:
MR. NORTON. The fact that this is in the Constitution of the United
States does us no good here; for it has been decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States that these provisions only apply in the United
States Courts. It is necessary that we should adopt it here if we desire
it to apply in our State courts. If we have adopted a number of sections
that might as well have been left out, it is no evidence against this.
They may be unnecessary -- this'may be necessary. I deem it of great
importance that a provision of this kind should form a part if our
fundamental law.
MR. HASTINGS. The section just adopted contains all that is necessary.
The question was then taken on the proposed section, and it was
rejected....40
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
39. BROWNE, 1849 DEBATES, supra note 11, at 294 (emphasis added).
40. Id at 294 (emphasis added).
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Thus, both Norton and his opponents are perfectly well aware
that they are arguing about whether to include in the California
Constitution two provisions (one, the safeguards provision, already
accepted) drawn from the Constitution of the United States. Mr.
Norton's point is merely to explain why it is "necessary to adopt
[such seemingly duplicative provisions] here." 41
As noted above, the criminal safeguards provision traces in
greatest measure back to the New York Constitution of 1821. We
shall therefore look to the debates of that constitutional convention
to see what they can tell us.42 Although we have little in the way
of general commentary on the section as a whole, there is at least
one illuminating exchange, which occurs early into the debate on
the bill, as a series of objections are raised. Suddenly, one Mr.
Jacob Radcliff, delegate from New York, raises a concern with
regard to the jeopardy clause, which is an integral part of the
criminal safeguards provision:
MR. RADCIFF wished to know why the expression of life or limb was
retained. -- Mr. Spencer [Chief Justice of the Court of Appeal] said, the
clause was taken from the amendments to the constitution of the United
States; though it was not expected that the legislature would ever pass
laws dismembering a criminal. The expression was rather now retained
to designate the offence for which this mode of punishment was
formeily enjoined, than as an expression of any punishment that ought
otherwise to have been inflicted.43
41. Id
42. See generally NEw YORK DEBAThS oF 1821,supra note 29. As is true of many recorded
proceedings of nineteenth century conventions, the Reports of the Proceedings and Debates of the
Convention of 1821 can be relatively cryptic, probably because most of the "action" took place in
committee or informally, as is the case in most legislative bodies. But, this does not mean that there
is not a good deal to be garnered from such records as these. And, certainly, the opacity of the
debates in no way reflects upon the quality of the delegates, which in the case of the 1821 convention
included the likes of Chancellor Kent, (later President) Martin Van Buren, New York Chief Justice
Ambrose Spencer and Rufus King, co-author of the first federal bill of rights in the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787. See infra note 92.
43. NEw YoRK DEBAS op 1821, supra note 29, at 165 (first emphasis in original, second
emphasis added). Mr. Radcliff then offered a substitute which would have eliminated the "life or
limb'" phrase. This was defeated, but at the subsequent convention of 1846, his view prevailed. See
supra note 33.
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A comparison of the texts of section 7 of the New York bill of
rights with the Fifth Amendment confirms the accuracy of the
Chief Justice's statement, at least as regards the main body of the
provision. The first clause of the provision does differ in certain
respects, for reasons largely explained in the debates. The rest of
the provision, which remains to this day largely the same in the
California Declaration of Rights, is identical to the corresponding
portion of the Fifth Amendment, except for the most
inconsequential stylistic changes, set forth in the margin."
It may be objected that the criminal safeguards provision was
amended in the 1879 constitution to insert additional provisions.
This is true, but the 1879 debates show that, with two notable
exceptions, those amendments were motivated precisely by a desire
to bring the state constitution into greater accord with the federal
Bill of Rights by adding federal provisions which had been
"overlooked" by the 1849 convention. The two exceptions were
the elimination of the right to indictment by grand jury, and the
addition of a provision allowing deposition of witnesses in non-
homicide criminal cases.45
44. We render in italics language added in the New York version, and strike-out language
removed from the federal provision:
Ncr shall mny pez No person shall be subject, for the same offence, to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall he be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness
against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.
7 W. SWINDLER, supra note 29, at 187. Compare the California language, set forth supra text
accompanying note 30.
45. These exceptions had the effect of removing the first clause of the 1849 Declaration,
regarding grand juries (which subject is then addressed in section 8 of the 1879 Declaration) and of
adding the deposition provision as the last clause of the provision. In addition, the eminent domain
clause was moved to section 14.
Putting these changes to one side, the rest of the criminal safeguards provision altered the 1849
section as shown below, with new language in italics and language eliminated struck out:
In criminal prosecutions, and in any tial ift my Court whatever, the party accused shall
be- aewed have the right to a speedy and public trial; to have the process of the Court
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf, and to appear and defend, in person
and with counsel as in eivile etie-s. No person shall be subjeet to be twice put in jeopardy
for the same offense; nor shag-he be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness
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The Judiciary Committee of the 1879 convention in its report
to the convention added a clause to the criminal safeguards
provision which specified a "speedy and public trial," a phrase
which is verbatim from the federal Sixth Amendment. The
chairman of the Committee on Preamble and Bill of Rights, Mr.
Walter Van Dyke, responded to the Judiciary Committee's proposal
by offering an amendment of his own, which actually incorporated
even more of the federal constitutional language:
MR. VAN DYKE. I have an amendment, to come in after the word
"'counsel," which I send up.
The SECRETARY read:
'To-be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, and to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor."
46
Mr. Van Dyke explained his proposed amendment, as follows:
Mr. Chairman: That amendment is taken from the amendments
to the Constitution of the United States, and is to be found in
nearly all the State Constitutions. It was substantially the same
as reported by the Committee on Preamble and Bill of Rights,
but the Judiciary Committee ... have omitted it. I do not
know why they should have omitted it.47
against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
I W. SWINDLER, supra note 13, at 471; THE ORIOINAL CONSTTUTmoN, supra note 30, at 54-55.
46. E. WILus AND P. STocKTON, DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF TE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF Tim STATE OF CALIFORNIA, vol. 1, at 343 (1880) [hereinafter DEBATES OF 1878-79].
The corresponding portions of the Sixth Amendment of the Bill of Rights reads:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have Assistance of
Counsel for his defence.
47. Id
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Despite Mr. Van Dyke's protestations, he failed to persuade his
colleagues to adopt the first clause (regarding the nature and cause
of the accusations), although the convention did incorporate the
others.
We have now accounted for all of the clauses of the criminal
safeguards provision, as they are presently embodied in section 15
of our Declaration of Rights, with the exception of the provision
for deposition of witnesses.4" That clause is genuinely unique and
has no federal constitutional equivalent. But it should be noted that
the purpose of that clause, as it was added at the 1879 convention,
was precisely to protect victims and witnesses from oppression by
the judicial system, and to prevent the defeat of justice.49 This is
not the only instance in which we shall see concern on the part of
constitutional delegates for the rights of victims and witnesses.5"
To sum up this portion of the argument, we cannot credit
Justice Grodin's assertion that "[despite the frequent use of
language similar and indeed, in some cases, identical to the federal
Bill of Rights, the delegates [at the 1849 convention] were not
looking to the federal Constitution as their model.""1 The reason
that much of the language of the California Declaration (and of the
New York bills of rights) is "similar and indeed, in some cases,
identical to the federal Bill of Rights" is because that is where that
language came from. Furthermore, as the colloquy involving
Chairman Norton quoted above illustrates, the point of adopting
this language was precisely to secure for Californians the rights
guaranteed by the considerably earlier federal Bill of Rights,
which, as Justice Grodin quite correctly emphasizes, they would
otherwise not have had. Once again, this is certainly not to say that
the delegates did not study diligently the constitutions of many of
48. As presently embodied, that clause reads: -'The Legislature may provide for the deposition
of a witness in the presence of the defendant and the defendant's counsel." CAL. CONST. art. I, §
1516].
49. DEBATES OF 1878-79, supra note 46, vol. I, at 344. See id. vol. III, at 1188-89.
50. See infra text accompanying notes 87-88 and note 105.
51. Grodin, Some Reflections, supra note 23, at 395; GRODIN, IN PURSUrT OP JUs7C, supra
note 26, at 121.
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the states, and it is not to deny that there are several unique--or,
anyway, nonfederal--elements to our state bill of rights.
In concluding this portion of the argument addressing the
criminal safeguards provision, we emphasize that we do not rest
our conclusions regarding Justice Grodin's argument upon that
provision alone. If in the following discussion we do not again
address the details of his claims, this is because we prefer to
concentrate on a preliminary reconstruction of the histories of some
of the provisions of the California Declaration of Rights which are
of greatest importance for the criminal law. We do permit ourselves
one final observation on this general topic--concerning the impact
that ideas about constitutional origins, unexamined, can have in the
real world.
The California Supreme Court recently decided Raven v.
Deukmejian," in which it struck down a provision of Proposition
115, which might well have amounted to the most sweeping reform
in California criminal jurisprudence in the state's history.53 In the
course of determining that the provision in question amounted to
an invalid "revision" of the state constitution, the court (in an
opinion by the Chief Justice) drew special attention to the historical
52. 52 Cal. 3d 336, 801 P.2d 1077, 276 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1990).
53. Proposition 115"s amendment to section 24 of article I would have required the court to
apply in criminal cases federal standards to a whole range of constitutional rights. As amended, the
section reads:
Rights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the
United States Constitution.
In criminal cases the rights of a defendant to equal protection of the laws, to due process
of law, to the assistance of counsel, to be personally present with counsel, to a speedy and
public trial, to compel the attendance of witnesses, to confront the witnesses against him
or her, to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, to privacy, to not be compelled
to be a witness against himself or herself, to not be placed twice in jeopardy for the same
offense, and to not suffer the imposition of cruel or unusual punishment, shall be
construed by the courts of this state in a manner consistent with the Constitution of the
United States. This Constitution shall not be construed by the courts to afford greater
rights to criminal defendants than those afforded by the Constitution of the United States,
nor shall it be construed to afford greater rights to minors in juvenile proceedings on
criminal causes than those afforded by the Constitution of the United States.
Text of Proposed Law, in CALIFORNIA BALLoT PAMPHLET 33 (June 5, 1990) (emphasis omitted). As
such, the provision would have struck at the heart of the "independent state grounds" argument
which the California Supreme Court has used for the past two decades to give defendants in criminal
cases rights beyond those deemed constitutionally required by the United States Constitution, as
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.
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background of our Declaration of Rights, in effect adopting Justice
Grodin's argument, in at least one of its dimensions:
As an historical matter, article I and its Declaration of Rights was
viewed as the only available protection for our citizens charged with
crimes, because the federal Constitution and its Bill of Rights was
initially deemed to apply only to the conduct of the federal government.
In framing the Declaration of Rights in both the 1849 and 1879
California Constitutions, the drafters largely looked to the constitutions
of the other states, rather than the federal Constitution, as potential
models. (See e.g., Mitchell v. Superior Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1230,
1241-1245 [265 Cal.Rptr. 144, 783 P.2d 731]; Barron v. Baltimore
(1833) 32 U.S. 243, 247-251 [8 L.Ed. 672, 674-675]; Grodin, Some
Reflections on State Constitutions (1988) 15 Hastings Const. L.Q. 391,
393-397.)54
Thus, the court's opinion in Raven essentially subscribed to the
"separate state origins" argument. It did so, not to establish its
power to render independent judgment--which was manifest,
anyway--but to support the court's ruling as to the issue at hand
upon expressly historical grounds. We believe that we have shown
that that reliance was misplaced. On the other hand, in recent
decades a prudent minority of the court has taken the opposing
tack, urging--in the words of the dissent in Houston--against
"basing holdings... on independent state constitutional grounds
where the language of the applicable provisions is almost identical
to the federal constitution, and without some greater showing of an
54. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 352-53, 801 P.2d at 1087-88,276 Cal. Rptr. at 336-37 (first emphasis
added, remainder in original). Barron v. Baltimore, of course, merely stands for the historical
proposition that the federal Bill of Rights did not then apply to the states. Barron v. Baltimore, 32
U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). The Raven court's citation to Mitchell v. Superior Court refers to a
discussion of the 1879 debates regarding the proper scope of the right to a jury trial. As we have
already noted and discuss at greater length below, that provision is certainly of non-federal origin.
See infra notes 95-102 and accompanying text. It does not, however, support the claim that as a
general matter "the drafters largely looked to the constitutions of the other states, rather than the
federal Constitution, as potential models." Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 353,801 P.2d at 1087,276 Cal. Rptr.
at 337. We do not suggest that the result in Raven would have been different had the court not gotten
this issue wrong. On the other hand, it certainly did not help the cause of those supporting the
constitutionality of Proposition 115's amendment to section 24.
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independent state interest needing additional protection.''" It
would be unfortunate if recent, erroneous conceptions of the
historical origins of the Declaration of Rights were to lead astray
those whose prior views reflected a more tempered historical
perspective.
2. The Search and Seizure Provision
The ostensible source of the search and seizure provision of the
California Declaration of Rights--section 19 of the 1849
Declaration--was the Iowa Constitution of 1846. This provision was
later taken over verbatim into the 1879 constitution, and is now
section 13 of the Declaration, with only stylistic changes. The
provision, as embodied in the 1849 and 1879 constitutions, read as
follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable seizures and searches, shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but on probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons and things to be seized.
56
As just mentioned, the Iowa constitution seems to be the
exemplar for this section, judging from close identity of language.
In fact, the California and Iowa provisions differ by only a single
word. But, it is precisely by appreciating the significance of that
single word that one may discern the true provenance of our state
search and seizure provision, as well as what the drafters had in
mind in making that singular change. The Iowa search and seizure
55. People v. Houston, 42 Cal. 3d 595, 624, 724 P.2d 1166, 1185, 230 Cal. Rptr. 141, 159
(1986) (Lucas, J., dissenting).
56. 1 W. SwINDLER, supra note 13, at 448,471. The present day version of article 1, section
13 reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated; and a warrant may not issue
except on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized.
CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 13.
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provision, article I, section 8 of the constitution of 1846, read as
follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable seizures and searches shall not be violated;
and no warrant shall issue but on probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
papers and things to be seized.
57
The drafters in Monterey changed just one word: They changed
"papers" to "persons." We do not believe that this just happened.
There is, after all, a big difference between being able to seize
"papers" and being able to seize "persons." So, how did it come
about that the drafters of the California Constitution decided upon
this considerable expansion of the search and seizure power, to
encompass not only inanimate objects, but human beings, as well?
Where did they get the idea?
One need not look far afield; the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution reads as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
58
The search and seizure provision was not among the original
group proposed by Mr. Gwin on behalf of the rights committee. It
was proposed during the debate, by Mr. Pacificus Ord of Monterey.
57. IowA CoNST. of 1846, art. I, § 8 (amended 1857) (emphasis added). Swindler misprints
this section of his edition of the Iowa Constitution of 1846, so that -persons- is substituted for
-papers.' See 3 W. SWIDLER, SouRcEs AND DOcUMENTs OF U.S. CONSnTMONS 435 (1974).
Poore misprints the entirety of the 1857 Iowa Constitution in place of the 1846 Iowa Constitution.
B. POORF, supra note 29, at 535-55. He thereby incorporates the same mistake into his edition as
does Swindler, since in 1857, the Iowans also changed "'papers" to "persons" in their new
constitution. In passing, it should also be noted that most of the provisions of the bill of rights of the
Iowa Constitution of 1846 were themselves taken over from the abortive 1844 Iowan constitution.
58. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV (emphasis added).
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Immediately after this provision was offered, the following
discussion took place:
MR. JoNES moved to amend the latter part of the amendment by
inserting "persons" instead of "papers," so as to read, "and the
persons and things to be seized."
MR. HASTINGS presumed it was a mere clerical error. Papers and things
would just amount to "things and things."
MR. ORD accepted the amendment.
MR. GWIN said this section, as amended, was word for word from the
Constitution of the United States, 4th article [sic].
59
Mr. Gwin's statement is not literally correct, of course. There
are differences, albeit of a purely stylistic nature, between the
wording of the provision adopted by California and the Fourth
Amendment. California uses "seizures and searches," rather than
"searches and seizures," as does the federal Bill of Rights.
California uses a singular, "warrant," rather than "warrants," and
speaks of "persons and things," instead of "persons or things,"
as does the federal version. But, what really emerges from this
account of the debates is a conscious effort to bring the California
"search and seizure" provision into substantive accord with the
federal standard. The distinctions that remained were purely
stylistic.' Thus, the authors of our Declaration of Rights changed
the Iowa "draft" so that it would mirror the Fourth Amendment
of the federal constitution. In its substance, then, section 19 of the
59. BRoWNS, 1849 DEBATrs, supra note 11, at 47-48 (emphasis added),
60. The only dispute with this statement of which we can reasonably conceive concerns that
most slippery of little words, "or." That is, it might be maintained that the change from "or" to
"and" in the language of the California search and seizure provision changes the substantive
meaning of the provision. Such a change certainly can have this effect. See our discussion of "cruel
or unusual punishments," infra text accompanying notes 77-85. But, in this case, it has no such
effect-unless one is willing to urge that a choice has to be made as to each warrant: you can seize
.'persons" or "things," but not both. What about the items in the suspect's pockets, or the pockets'
pants? Can you seize him, but not them? Why not just have two identical warrants, except that one
describes the suspect and the other the things? But why waste the trees? The argument just does not
hold water.
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California Declaration of Rights equals the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution."
3. The Great Writ
The writ of habeas corpus was of imposing consequence to the
drafters of the 1849 constitution, and the energy of their debate
reflects this.62 The initial proposal offered at the convention of
1849, was: "IV. The privileges of the writ of habeas corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion,
the public safety may require its suspension.", 63 One delegate, Mr.
Charles T. Botts, a lawyer and magazine editor from Virginia,'
proposed to add "in the opinion of the Legislature" after "public
safety," and justified his proposal in part thus:
[H]e begged that gentlemen would consider for a moment what they
were doing. Did they know what it was to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus? -- to declare martial law, and leave the power in the hands of
a single individual? It is nothing less than to make a Dictator of that
individual. He can at his will and pleasure arrest citizens of the State.
... You disfranchise every man .... Is it the desire of gentlemen to
place their constituents in this position?
65
61. Furthermore, attempts to do an "end-run" around the federal Bill of Rights by seeking
to trace the provision through pre-1791 state constitutions fail. First, search and seizure provisions
of the latter sort were of recent vintage in the late eighteenth century. Although some earlier state
constitutions had such clauses, the Fourth Amendment was original in respects which are fundamental
to our modem notion of search and seizure law. Furthermore, the earlier provisions, such as those
in Virginia and Maryland, typically stated that general warrants "'ought" not to issue. See 5 P.
KURLAND & R. LERNER, THE FOuNDERs' CoNsTrrtrTON 259 (1987). On the one hand, the Fourth
Amendment for the first time made the injunction emphatic-"shall"--while on the other hand
introducing the notion of "'probable cause," as the regulator of the provision. "Probable cause" is
now, of course, the central conception of modem search and seizure law. As one scholar of the
Fourth Amendment has remarked, -[t]he ideas comprising the Fourth Amendment reversed rather
than formalized colonial precedents. Reasonable search and seizure in colonial America closely
approximated whatever the searcher thought reasonable." LEVY, OasoINAL INTENT, supra note 6, at
224 (quoting William Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning, chapt. 7
(Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, manuscript-then-in-progress)). See id at 242-46.
62. BROWNE, 1849 DEBAThS, supra note 11, at 39-41.
63. Id at 30. Note the use of the plural, "privileges," which did not survive in the final draft.
64. W. HANSEN, THE SEARCH FOR AUTHORITY IN CALtFORNIA 103 (1960) [hereinafter
HANSEN, SEARCH].
65. BROWNE, 1849 DEBATEs, supra note 11, at 40.
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Thus challenged, two prominent members responded as follows:
MR. GwiN read from the Constitution of the United States the following
clause:
"'The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the
public safety may require it."
MR. SHANNON thought the gentleman's principles (Mr. Botts') beautiful
enough in theory, but he was afraid they would be found rather
inconvenient in practice. . . . Above all, it is a provision of the
Constitution of the United States.6
Mr. Botts' motion to amend the provision failed, as did another,
similar amendment. The provision was later adopted, in the form
originally proposed--which differs from the federal provision only
in matters of style, as does our present provision.67
4. Bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, etc.
Section 16 of the 1849 Declaration provided that: "No bill of
attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of
contracts, shall ever be passed." 68 This language is taken verbatim
from the Iowa Constitution of 1846, but it also closely resembles
66. Mi (first emphasis in original, second emphasis added). We have already met Mr. Gwin,
the original proponent of much of the substance of our Declaration. Mr. Gwin would later become
one of California's first United States Senators. BEAN AND RAWLs, CALIFORNIA, supra note 10, at
121. See generally HANSEN, SEARCi, supra note 64, at 103-104. Mr. Shannon was a Sacramento
lawyer and former military officer, who would be remembered for introducing section 18 of the
Declaration, which prohibited slavery. Id at 102.
67. Lest anyone question whether the small difference in wording between the California and
federal versions might reflect origins other than the federal Bill of Rights, we would point out that
our state's habeas corpus clause is identical to that adopted in the New York Constitution of 1821,
and that the 1821 provision as initially proposed at that convention was identical to that of the United
States Constitution, Article I, section 9(2), except in being preceded by a "that": "That the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion,
the public safety may require it." NEW YORK DEBATE OF 1821, supra note 29, at 102. The original
wording was kept in the 1879 constitution. The present provision (as reworded in 1974) is section
11 of the Declaration and reads: "Habeas corpus may not be suspended unless required by public
safety in cases of rebellion or invasion." CAL. CoNST. art. I, § 11.
68. ThnE ORIGINAL CONsTrrrmoN, supra note 30, at 58.
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language in the federal constitution. The federal charter actually
speaks to the issue at hand twice in its First Article. With regard
to the federal government, it states in section 9[3] that: "No Bill
of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed. ' 69 Section
10[1] provides in relevant part that "No State shall... pass any
Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts .... "
7 0
At the 1879 convention the initial proposal by the Committee
on Preamble and Bill of Rights amended this provision, adding the
phrase, "or the remedy for the enforcement or breach thereof," at
the end of the "contracts" clause. This proposed amendment was
opposed, as follows:
MR. WINANS. Mr. Chairman: I hope this Convention will adopt as a
cardinal rule of procedure that amendments to the present Constitution
in all cases, except where the wishes of the people and the exigencies
of the times demand a change, shall not be adopted. Now, sir, the
Constitution as it stands in this case in reference to this question is
identical with the provisions of the Constitution of the United States,
which says: "Congress shall pass no bill of attainder, ex post facto law,
or law impairing the obligation of a contract." But the words proposed
to be introduced here have a very doubtful meaning.... I am opposed
to the section as advocated by the Committee on Preamble and Bill of
Rights.7 1
Whereupon, the proposal to amend the provision was rejected.
Except in style, the language of this provision has remained the
same to this day.7"
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9[3].
70. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 10[11.
71. DEBATES OF 1878-79, supra note 46, vol. I, at 268 (emphasis added).
72. As presently embodied in article I, section 9, the provision reads: "A bill of attainder, ex
post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts may not be passed.- CAL. CONST. art.
I, § 9.
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5. The Bail Provisions and the "Cruel or Unusual
Punishments" Clause
The issue of bail in criminal cases (along with several other
issues) was dealt with in two provisions, sections 6 and 7, of the
1849 Declaration, later combined in the 1879 constitution. The two
sections read as follows:
Sec. 6. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor shall cruel or unusual punishments be inflicted, nor shall
witnesses be unreasonably detained.
Sec. 7. All persons shall be bailable, by sufficient sureties: unless
for capital offences, when the proof is evident or the presumption
great.
73
These two sections must be addressed separately, because their
derivations, to the extent that they can reasonably be made out, are
separate.
a. Section 6
With regard to section 6, as it was originally presented to the
1849 convention, the California Supreme Court has correctly
observed, that "[blut for the addition of the 'witness' clause, the
proposed section was identical to the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution."' 74 Furthermore, the language of the
proposed section--including the "witness" clause--came verbatim
from the New York Constitution of 1846. Unfortunately, neither the
California debates nor the 1846 New York debates address the
source of the "excessive bail [or] fine" clauses of this section.
But, in light of all that we have seen up until this point, regarding
the attention paid to the federal constitution in regard to criminal
73. THE O iriI4AL CoNsTrruToN, supra note 30, at 53. See 1 W. SWINDLER, supra note 13,
at 447.
74. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 634-35, 493 P.2d 890, 884, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 156
(1972).
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provisions, and in light of the identity of language with the United
States Constitution, we do consider it appropriate that those who
advocate an independent or separate state source for those clauses
ought to bear the burden of establishing that the drafters had
something else in mind when they chose this language other than
adopting the federal right into the state charter."
On the other hand, this still leaves two important areas of this
provision unaccounted for, since they certainly do differ from the
federal version. As noted, one is the "witness" clause, which we
discuss below.76 The other is the "cruel or unusual punishments"
clause, which attracted much attention as a result of being relied
upon by the California Supreme Court to declare the death penalty
unconstitutional under the California Constitution in People v.
Anderson7 7 in 1972.
In Anderson, the court first stated its conclusion--that "capital
punishment is both cruel and unusual as those terms are defined
under article I, section 6, of the California Constitution" 7 --and
then set about trying to show that, as a historical matter, the "cruel
or unusual" language of the California document was intended to
have a different meaning from the "cruel and unusual" language
of the Eighth Amendment to the federal constitution, and that that
meaning supported the holding of the court, banning the death
penalty.79 It is with that historical argument that we are concerned
now.
75. This is not to assert that the drafters could not have taken this language from another
source; on the contrary, this language was already relatively ancient and well-known when the federal
document was drafted. As noted in a recent United States Supreme Court opinion, it comes from the
English Bill of Rights of 1689, which provided "[t]hat excessive Baile ought not to be required nor
excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall Punishments inflicted." Harmelin v. Michigan, 111
S. Ct. 2680, 2687 (1991) (quoting the English Bill of Rights of 1689). Regarding the history of the
provision, compare the "duelling opinions" by Justice Scalia and Justice White. Id. at 2684-702
(Justice Scalia), and id. at 2709-19 (Justice White).
76. See infra text accompanying notes 87-88.
77. 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972).
78. 1d. at 633, 493 P.2d at 883, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
79. One cannot help but wonder, if the court concluded that capital punishment was "both
cruel and unusual" (as it said it did) why it was necessary to show that it was "cruel or unusual"
under the California Constitution, except in order to prevent the United States Supreme Court, which
was at that same time considering the same issue, from reversing the California court. See generally
Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State Ground, 45 S. CA. L. Rav. 750 (1972).
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Chief Justice Wright's opinion for the court begins with a
detailed discussion of the debates at the constitutional convention
of 1849, with one major oversight discussed below. He cites
repeatedly to the Reports of the Debates. He notes correctly that
the section as originally introduced was consistent with the federal
(and the New York) language, stating that "cruel and unusual
punishments" shall not be inflicted. And, he rightly observes that
during the course of the convention the delegates gained access to
all the other state constitutions, several of which included the
"cruel or unusual" wording. Moreover, it is reasonably certain that
this change was a last minute alteration. Although not noted by the
court in Anderson, a published facsimile of the final draft of the
articles of the 1849 constitution shows that in section 6, an
emendation has been made, in which the "and" between "cruel"
and "unusual" has been crossed-out and a carrot inserted pointing
up to an "or," seemingly written in a different hand, more or less
thus:
or
cruel^and unusual punishments .... 80
This is presumably the manuscript origin of the difference in
phrasing. That the change was made at the last moment does not
imply that it was necessarily unimportant, by any means. We
simply have no record of any discussion or debate that might have
gone into making the change. We do not know. On the other hand,
the court's conclusion in Anderson that "the delegates ... were
aware of the significance of the disjunctive form and that its use
was purposeful"8' certainly makes some sense.
What does not make any sense is the second half of the court's
historical argument--that this change from "and" to "or" provides
historical support for their conclusion that capital punishment
violates the California Constitution. Given the rather embarrassing
absence of any supporting evidence for its position, the court seems
80. TUE OR OINAL CONSTrrION, supra note 30, at 53.
81. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d at 634, 493 P.2d at 883, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
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to have been satisfied to respond to the argument by the Attorney
General in Anderson that various phrases in other portions of the
California Constitution presume the presence of capital punishment,
as did a then-recent constitutional revision in Proposition 1-a in
1966:
To interpret the adoption of Proposition 1-a or the presence in other
provisions of the Constitution of references to capital punishment as
intended to bar future judicial consideration of the possible cruel or
unusual nature of capital punishment would violate the most elementary
rules of constitutional construction. "We do not... approve of that
principle of constitutional construction, which seeks by vague surmises,
or even probable conjecture, or general speculation of a policy not
distinctly expressed, to control the express language of the instrument;
since such a mode would not unfrequently change the instrument from
what its framers made it, into what the Judges think it should have
been." (People v. Weller (1858) 11 Cal. 77, 86.) The Constitution
expressly proscribes cruel or unusual punishments. It would be mere
speculation and conjecture to ascribe to the framers an intent to exempt
capital punishment from the compass of that provision solely because
at a time when the death penalty was commonly accepted they provided
elsewhere in the Constitution for special safeguards in its
application.
82
What is remarkable about this passage, coming in an opinion
which is so expressly founded upon examination of the Debates at
the constitutional conventions, is that it manages to overlook the
fact that the delegates in 1849 forthrightly considered a
constitutional amendment stating that capital punishment violated
the provision in question in the course of their .debate, and
overwhelmingly rejected it:
MR. HASTINGS moved the following as an additional section [to the
Declaration of Rights]:
As the true design of all punishment is to reform and not to
exterminate mankind, death shall never be inflicted as a
punishment for crime in the State.
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MR. HASTINGS. I do not know, sir, what favor this question may meet
with here -- whether it will have a single supporter but myself. It has,
however, found many supporters ... in every State of the Union. And,
sir, the time is fast approaching when this great principle will be
engrafted into the laws of all the different States. My opinion is, that
this new State should adopt it, and that it should be incorporated in the
bill of rights.
8 3
As Professor Fritz has noted, "[a]lthough one delegate half-
heartedly seconded consideration of Hastings' proposal, the
convention--with no recorded debate--quickly rejected making the
death penalty unconstitutional.",8 4  Similar amendments were
offered--and defeated--at both the New York and Iowa
constitutional conventions of the 1840's. 5
It is one thing for judges to make the law "into what [they]
think it should have been" when the original intent of the drafters
of a constitution cannot be reasonably inferred; it is quite another
to act in contradiction of the drafters' intent while passing over
their views in silence. In any case, as we shall discuss below,
Anderson was overruled by initiative only two years after it was
decided.86
The final clause of section 6 of the 1849 Declaration provided,
"nor shall witnesses be unreasonably detained."817 This passage
has no federal counterpart and is interesting for its reflection of
concern about the fates of victims and witnesses, a matter also of
83. BROWNE, 1849 DEBAT.S, supra note 11, at 45.
84. Fritz, supra note 13, at 27-28. Nor is much to be accomplished by examination of the
1879 Debates. As the court itself opined, "[w]e find no indication in the Debates and Proceedings
of the Constitutional Convention of 1878-1879 that the delegates to that convention intended any
change in the meaning of the section. To the contrary .... "Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d at 637 n.18, 493
P.2d at 885 n.18, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 157 n.18.
85. In New York, the proposal seems to have died in committee. See W. BISHOP AND W.
A'rrE., REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NEw YORK, 1846, at 105 (Albany 1846) [hereinafter NEW
Yoax DEBATES AND PROCEEDNoS OF 1846]; regarding Iowa, see B. SHAMBAUGH, FRAGMENTS OF
THE DEBATES OF THE IOWA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS OF 1844 AND 1846 ALONG WITH PRESS
COMMENTS AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE CONSTITUTIONS OF 1844 AND 1846, at 161 (1900).
86. See infra text accompanying notes 144-147.
87. THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 30, at 53. The clause is now the first sentence
of section 10 of the Declaration, and reads: "Witnesses may not be unreasonably detained." CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 10[I].
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considerable interest in recent times. As mentioned earlier, the
clause comes verbatim from the New York Constitution of 1846.
The debates of 1846 show General Tallmadge, recounting some of
the abuses common in the era, including instances in which victims
of serious crimes such as rape were confined for long periods,
while the perpetrators were allowed to go free on bail. 8 While
abuses of this degree are largely a thing of the past, it is a
testament to the concern for the treatment of victims and witnesses
that the drafters of both the New York and California Constitutions
would incorporate provisions such as this one into their bills of
rights.
b. Section 7
Section 7 of the 1849 Declaration also addressed the bail issue
and so was later merged with the section discussed above into
section 6 of the 1879 Declaration. Although it was taken in slightly
modified form from the Iowa Constitution and finds no parallel in
the United States Constitution, it is actually of federal origin. Like
section 18 of the 1849 Declaration, which outlawed slavery in
California, its unique language comes from the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787."9 This document, which was drafted by the
Confederation Congress and was the first federal document to
contain a bill of rights, "established a model for territorial
governance and the admission of other states in the American
88. As General Tallmadge recites one such instance:
Three villians committed a rape upon a woinan, just north of the city of Albany, in what
are called the Patroon's woods. She was a cook upon one of the canal boats, and was
therefore considered by the magistrate a transient person; and upon her entering complaint
against the villians, she was committed to the jail in this city, while the rascals were
enabled to obtain bail, and had never been brought to trial. That poor woman lay in jail
fifteen months, and until ... she was at length set at liberty.
NEw YORK DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF 1846, supra note 85, at 539.
89. See L. Levy, Northwest Ordinance (1787), ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTm=ON 1329 (1986) (observation of Professor Levy) ("[I]n a precedent-making clause [the
Ordinance] declared, 'There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude' in the Northwest
Territory or states formed from it."). Cf. CAL. CONST. OF 1849, art. I, § 18 (now embodied in section
6 of article I).
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West."'  It is not surprising therefore that its language was
familiar to the 1849 drafters. 91 As set forth in the Ordinance, the
provision stated that: "All persons shall be bailable unless for
capital offences, where the proof shall be evident, or the
presumption great .... 92
6. Treason
Though very rarely cited, the debate on the "treason" provision
(section 20 of the 1849 Declaration) is briefly addressed here
because it is a criminal provision, certainly, and because it carries
forward the prior theme. Upon the section being proposed, the
wording of the provision was identical to that in the federal
constitution, except in referring to the "state":
Treason against the state shall consist only in levying war against it,
adhering to its enemies, or giving them aid and comfort. No person
shall be convicted of treason, unless on the evidence of two witnesses
to the same overt act, or confession in open court.
93
90. L. Levy, Northwest Ordinance (1787), supra note 89, at 1329.
91. Unlike those provisions taken from the federal constitution, there is no explicit indication
in the Debates that the drafters were aware that the provision came from the Northwest Ordinance.
On the other hand, they may well have been. For instance, the rights guaranteed by the Northwest
Ordinance, including this provision, applied to Iowans until the adoption of its 1846 constitution and
must therefore have been known to them, as well as to the drafters of the constitutions of other
western states. See B. SHAMBAUGH, HISTORY OF THE CONSTrtIONS OF IOWA 105-120 (1902).
92. 1 W. SWINDLER, SOURCES AND DocuMENTs OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS:
NATIONAL DOcuMENTS 1492-1800, at 387-388 (Second Series 1982). See F. WILLIAMS, THE
NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, ESSAYS ON ITS FORMULATION, PROVISIONS, AND LEOACY 124 (1989). It
should be noted that similar language was originally proposed but rejected at the New York debates
of 1821. See NEw YORK DEBATES OF 1821, supra note 29, at 103, 169. That such similar language
was proposed is not surprising, both because more than 30 years had elapsed since the Ordinance,
and because one of the two primary drafters of the Northwest Ordinance, Rufus King, also held a
prominent position at the 1821 convention. See Levy, supra note 89, at 1329; NEw YORK DEBATES
OF 1821, supra note 29, at 28, 38.
93. THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 30, at 59-60. See 1 W. SWINDLER, supra note
13, at 448. The same language was taken over in the constitution of 1879. It remains the same today
as section 18, with only stylistic changes made in 1974:
Treason against the State consists only in levying war against it, adhering to its enemies,
or giving them aid and comfort. A person may not be convicted of treason except on the
evidence of two witnesses to the same overt act or by confession in open court.
CAI.. CONST. art I, § 18.
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Mr. Botts (whom we met earlier complaining about the habeas
corpus section) objected:
MR. BoTrs proposed to strike out the latter clause, commencing "No
person shall be convicted of treason," &c. He thought treason should
stand on the same footing with any other crime .... It is a strong
incentive to crime to say in this Constitution, that treason, the greatest
of crimes, shall have this advantage over all others; and that the
prisoner may go scot free, unless this provision is complied with. He
(Mr. Botts) would read a sentence from Blackstone in relation to the
punishment of high treason.
MR. GwIN considered the Constitution of the United States better
authority than Blackstone.
The question was then taken on the amendment of Mr. Botts, to strike
out the latter clause, and decided in the negative.
The original amendment was then adopted. 94
E. Non-Federal Provisions and Their Strange Histories
1. The Jury Trial Provision
The right of trial by jury is another provision of the Declaration
of Rights--which, by the way, was called the' 'Bill of Rights" until
the word "Bill" was scratched out and replaced in the final
version95--with obvious implications for the criminal law. In this
case, though, we are dealing with a provision which has no close
parallel in the federal constitution. In the 1849 constitution, the
provision, section 3, read:
The right of trial by jury shall be secured to all, and remain inviolate
forever; but a jury trial may be waived by the parties, in all civil cases,
in the manner to be prescribed by law.
96
94. BROWNE, 1849 DEBATES, supra note 11, at 48 (emphasis added).
95. Tim OIGINAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 30, at 51.
96. 1&c at 52. See 1 W. SwINDLER, supra note 13, at 447.
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This is also how it read in the version originally proposed by
Mr. Gwin, who stated that it came from the New York
Constitution.97 As a matter of fact, though, Mr. Gwin's assertion
is not entirely correct. Much of the provision does certainly seem
to be derived from Article I, Section 2 of the New York
Constitution of 1846. The New York version read:
The trial by jury in all cases in which it has been heretofore used shall
remain inviolate forever; but a jury-trial may be waived by the parties
in all civil cases in the manner to be prescribed by law.
98
It will be noted that the two provisions are very similar; indeed,
the second clause and the last portion of the first ("and remain
inviolate forever") are virtually identical. But the initial clause is
different: the New York version rather ploddingly recounts that
they will go on using jury trials in the same way they have in the
past, and not otherwise; but the California version, with seemingly
grander sweep, assures that the "right of trial by jury shall be
secured to all ..... ,99
This initial clause is also the only part of the jury provision
which survives in the present Declaration of Rights. The second
clause was altered substantially, and after long and rancorous
debate, by the convention delegates in 1879.
We have here language which is unique, at least in the sense
that it differs not only from the United States Constitution, but also
from its direct model, the New York jury trial provision. Moreover,
there seems to be no record of whatever deliberations (if any) went
into drafting it.
We can, nonetheless, reasonably draw a couple of conclusions.
First, it must have been intended to mean something different from
what the New York version meant. Otherwise, there would seem
to have been no reason to redraft the language, changing the
historical test ("in which it has been heretofore used") to such a
97. BRowzs, 1849 DEBAi'Es, supra note 11, at 30-31.
98. 7 W. SwINDLER, supra note 29, at 192.
99. All what remains unclear. All persons? All cases? All criminal cases? Compare the second
clause, distinguishing civil cases.
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more general injunction ("secured to all"). Second, is precisely the
point that what we have here is a general injunction, casting aside
the limitations of the New York Constitution. It is therefore logical
to conclude that the California right was meant to be more
expansive than the New York variety--or, for that matter, than the
corresponding federal version.
So, what has the California Supreme Court made of this?
Essentially, the court has given this seemingly expansive provision
about as restrictive a meaning as the words will bear. Indeed, their
interpretation corresponds, no doubt unintentionally but with
uncanny precision, with the only interpretation that can definitely
be eliminated as the meaning of the provision--namely, the New
Yorkers' intention that the right be limited to those "cases in
which it has been heretofore used."
The established rule in California is that the right to jury trial
does not extend to offenses to which it was not applicable at the
time of the adoption of the California Constitution. In the leading
case, People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe,"° the supreme court
held that:
"The right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Constitution is the right as
it existed at common law at the time the Constitution was adopted. The
common law at the time the Constitution was adopted includes not only
the lex non scripta but also the written statutes enacted by Parliament.
The common law respecting trial by jury as it existed in 1850 is the
rule of decision in this state."' t1
100. 37 Cal. 2d 283, 231 P.2d 832 (1951).
101. IM at 286-87, 231 P.2d at 835 (citations omitted) (the court, with some deletions and
additions, adopted the opinion of the district court of appeal). Or, as the court stated more recently,
in C & K Engineering Contractors v. Amber Steel Co., 23 Cal. 3d 1, 587 P.2d 1136, 151 Cal. Rptr.
323 (1978):
The right to a jury trial is guaranteed by our Constitution. We have long acknowledged
that the right so guaranteed, however, is the right as it existed at common law in 1850,
when the Constitution was first adopted, "and what that right is, is a purely historical
question, a fact which is to be ascertained like any other social, political or legal fact."
Id at 8, 587 P.2d at 1139, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 326 (citation omitted). Accord Crouchman v. Superior
Court, 45 Cal. 3d 1167, 1173-74, 755 P.2d 1075, 1077-78, 248 Cal. Rptr. 626, 628-29 (1988).
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This rigid historical principle has since been confirned in a
variety of contexts, both civil and criminal, by the California courts
of appeal.'0 2
2.' The 1879 Reforms to the Grand Jury System
As with the reforms to the jury trial right, the grand jury system
was the subject of great controversy at the 1879 convention. In
fact, this provision probably occupied as much time at the
convention as any other in the whole constitution. Here too, the
reformers deliberately departed from the federal model. Here too,
their efforts have recently been poorly served by our state supreme
court. 103
As noted above, the delegates at the 1849 convention had
adopted the federal rule that no one was to be "held to answer for
a capital or otherwise infamous crime ... unless on presentment
or indictment of a grand jury."" 4 In the years following the
ratification of the first constitution, this requirement gave rise to
considerable dissatisfaction, on account of the expense and
oppression it occasioned. Consequently, many of those who
gathered at the 1879 convention wished to abolish the system
altogether. Others wished to preserve it. Amongst the former, the
grand jury system was denounced as favoring the rich, as tending
to undermine responsibility by diffusing it among many jurors, and
as generally antiquated: "Institutions with no other
recommendation than age had better fall and be buried in the
102. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Superior Court, 204 Cal. App. 3d 1513, 1529,
252 Cal. Rptr. 320,330 (1988) (regarding declaratory relief); People v. Oliver, 196 Cal. App. 3d 423,
429-30, 241 Cal. Rptr. 804, 806-08 (1987) (regarding jury procedures in a criminal trial); People v.
Anderson, 191 Cal. App. 3d 207, 219-20, 236 Cal. Rptr. 329, 337-38 (1987) (regarding an infraction
under the Agricultural Code); A-C Co. v. Security Pacific Nat. Bank, 173 Cal. App. 3d 462, 472-73,
219 Cal. Rptr. 62, 68-69 (1985) (regarding the legal-equitable distinction). See also People v.
Oppenheimer, 42 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 4, 8, 116 Cal. Rptr. 795, 798 (1974) (regarding a traffic
infraction). Cf In re Javier A., 159 Cal. App. 3d 913, 927-29, 206 Cal. Rptr. 386, 394-96 (1984)
(urging that jury trials be given minors, based on the claim that such was the law in England in
1850).
103. But see infra note 129.
104. THE ORIOINAL CONSTITtTION, supra note 30, at 54; 1 W. SwMIDLER, supra note 13, at
447-48.
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closets of the past." 105 On the other side, it was urged that both
the United States Constitution and the existing (1849) constitution
provided for indictment by a grand jury and that it was dangerous
to the rights of innocent persons to permit prosecution for a felony
on the basis of one person's decision, whether that person be a
prosecutor or a magistrate.106 In the event, neither side prevailed.
After extended argument, the opposing sides reached a
compromise, which allowed continuance of the grand jury system
but also permitted the legislature to provide for an alternative
system of prosecution:
It is the proposition of the Judiciary Committee that this whole matter
be delegated to the Legislature, after providing that at least one Grand
Jury shall be drawn per annum. It leaves the power of prosecution by
indictment or presentment -- information it is called here -- to the
discretion of the Legislature. They can restore it as a whole and leave
out the word "information," or they can follow out the plan indicated
here, and prosecute by both indictment and information. 
1
7
Accordingly, as adopted in the 1879 constitution, section 8
read:
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment shall be
prosecuted by information, after examination and commitment by a
magistrate, or by indictment, with or without such examination and
commitment, as may be prescribed by law. A grand jury shall be drawn
and summoned at least once a year in each county.
10 8
105. DFBATEs OF 1878-79, supra note 46, vol. I, at 313 (Mr. Beerstecher). In another
illustration of concern for victims and witnesses, an opponent of the existing system complained that:
Under the present system, in cases of the commission of crime, those of the people who
are known to be cognizant of it are first compelled to appear before the committing
magistrate as witnesses. They are again compelled to appear before the Grand Jury and
in many cases having to travel a long distance to the county seat,... and finally, when
the case comes up for trial, they are again subjected to the same hardship.
Id. at 314 (Mr. Huestis).
106. 1& at 308-09. See id vol. III, at 1177.
107. Id vol. I, at 318.
108. 1 W. SWINDLER, supra note 13, at 470.
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This system survived for 99 years. Certain amendments to
section 8 were passed in 1934, prescribing that a defendant be
provided with a copy of the complaint which should in turn be read
to him upon request, and that he be informed of and given an
opportunity to exercise his right to counsel--rights which remain in
the Declaration today. But none of these amendments materially
altered the grand jury system. Again, in the early 1970's, the
Constitutional Revision Commission recommended a variety of
simplifications and changes to the constitution, discussed at greater
length below; but they expressly declined to alter the grand jury,
finding that this was appropriately the task of the legislature.
10 9
As adopted by the California voters in 1974, the grand jury
procedure was retained intact, except that the state legislature was
allowed to arrange to call a grand jury more often than
previously 110
The case law also consistently supported the system of
alternative prosecution by either indictment or information. During
the early period, the most proriinent attack on the system came
from those who insisted that they had a right to indictment by
grand jury--that a preliminary hearing was constitutionally
inadequate. This argument was rejected by the United States
Supreme Court in 1884,"' and this rule remains the law of the
109. In his dissent in Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 584,586 P.2d 916,150 Cal. Rptr.
435 (1978), Justice Richardson quotes from the Commission's report, as follows:
"Existing Section 8 contains extensive provision for criminal indictment procedures....
[ ] Indictment procedures are significant because they assure certain guarantees to all
those accused of crimes. Although much of the procedural material in existing Section 8
is recommended for transfer to statutes, the Commission feels that retention of some basic
provisions is warranted and desirable. [1] .... The entire grand jury system has many
deficiencies which should be corrected. The Commission believes that the Legislature is
best equipped to reform this system and that reform should not be hampered by
unnecessary constitutional restrictions."
Id. at 613, 586 P.2d at 935, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 454 (quoting CAL. CONST. REVIS1ON COM., PROPOSED
REVISION OF THE CAL. CONST., pt. 5, at 22 (1971)) (emphasis in opinion).
110. As described by the Legislative Analyst:
Grand Juries. Presently the Constitution requires each county to summon a grand jury
once each year. Without changing that requirement, this proposition allows the Legislature
to provide for summoning more than one grand jury each year.
Office of the Secretary of State, in CALIFORNiA VOTERS PAMPHLET 26 (November 5, 1974)
[hereinafter VOTERS PAMPHaLer].
111. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884).
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land today. Attacks upon indictment by grand jury were similarly
rejected by the California Supreme Court. 1  As late as 1972,
Justice Mosk, writing for a unanimous court in People v.
Sirhan,13 expressly rejected constitutional attacks upon the grand
jury system, as follows:"
4
It has long been the rule in this state . .. that felonies may be
prosecuted by either indictment or information.1 15 Although there are
differences between the two procedures, a defendant who is proceeded
against by an indictment is not denied due process or equal
protection 1 61 It similarly does not violate due process to initiate a
prosecution by an information rather than an indictment.1 71
In support of his contention defendant relies upon cases in which it was
held that constitutionally impermissible classifications were contained
in the legislation or rule there in question.t1181 The provisions which
concern us here do not contain such a classification."1
9
Thus, by 1978, it had been established for virtually a century
that prosecution by grand jury indictment (without a preliminary
hearing) was constitutional, that prosecution by information and
preliminary hearing was also constitutional, and that the authority
112. See People v. Goldenson, 76 Cal. 328,345, 19 P. 161,168-69 (1888); People v. Bird, 212
Cal. 632, 643-46, 300 P. 23, 28 (1931).
113. 7 Cal. 3d 710,497 P.2d 1121, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1972) (Justice McComb concurred in
the court's opinion, except insofar as it commuted the death sentence originally imposed).
114. For purposes of clarity, Justice Mosk's citations have been removed from the text and
placed in footnotes 115-118.
115. In support of this proposition, Justice Mosk cites: CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 8; CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 682, 737, 739, 917, 949 (West 1972).
116. Citing In re Wells, 20 Cal. App. 3d 640, 649, 98 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5-6 (1971); People v.
Pearce, 8 Cal. App. 3d 984,986-89,87 Cal. Rptr. 814,815-18 (1970); People v. Newton, 8 Cal. App.
3d 359, 388, 87 Cal. Rptr. 394, 413 (1970); People v. Rojas, 2 Cal. App. 3d 767,771, 82 Cal. Rptr.
862, 864-65 (1969); People v. Flores, 276 Cal. App. 2d 61, 65-66, 81 Cal. Rptr. 197, 200 (1969).
117. Citing Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516,538 (1884); In re Terry, 4 Cal. 3d 911,926,
484 P.2d 1375, 1386, 95 Cal. Rptr. 31, 42 (1971).
118. Citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (classification based on race); Douglas
v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (classification based on indigency); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942) (classification requiring sterilization under certain circumstances of persons convicted
of larceny but not of those convicted of embezzlement).
119. Sirhan, 7 Cal. 3d at 746-47,497 P.2d at 1146, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 410 (citations omitted and
added as footnotes).
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to modify the system was properly with the legislature.
Furthermore, the Committee recently entrusted with the task of up-
dating the state constitution had affirmed these conclusions, the
Committee's recommendations were approved by the people by
popular vote, and the state supreme court had itself unanimously
concurred. It is in this context that the court reversed field and
handed down its opinion, authored by Justice Mosk, in Hawkins v.
Superior Court.2 °
In that case, the court ruled (over a vigorous dissent by Justice
Richardson, joined by Justice Clark) that the grand jury provision
of the California Declaration of Rights violated the equal protection
provision of section 7 of the same Declaration, notwithstanding its
contrary conclusion six years earlier. The ground for this decision
was "excessive prosecutorial influence.'' For the majority, the
grand jury was "the total captive of the prosecutor;" suffering
from "institutional schizophrenia" because it is subject to the
prosecutor's "completely unfettered discretion," such that the
prosecutor himself is free to "act whimsically" because he finds
himself in a "prosecutor's Eden."' The court went on to find
that any indictment must be followed by a preliminary hearing. The
court thereby virtually abolished the criminal grand jury.
Not only is this result at odds with the previous legal history of
the grand jury in California, it is completely out of step with the
rest of the nation. First, there is a strong contrast between the
California Supreme Court in Hawkins and the United States
Supreme Court regarding the grand jury system, both as to
1228
120. 22 Cal. 3d 584, 586 P.2d 916, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1978).
121. id. at 591, 586 P.2d at 920, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 439.
122. ld. at 590-92, 586 P.2d at 919-21, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 438-40.
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substantive law' and overall attitude. 124  Even more
remarkable, though, is the contrast between their respective
opinions regarding the leading role of the prosecutor in that system.
For the federal High Court, that role is not an opportunity for
"whimsical[]" behavior, but is a salutary guide for the grand jury's
deliberations:
The purpose of the grand jury requires that it remain free, within
constitutional and statutory limits, to operate "independently of either
prosecuting attorney or judge." Nevertheless, a modem grand jury
would be much less effective without the assistance of the prosecutor's
office and the investigative resources it commands. The prosecutor
ordinarily brings matters to the attention of the grand jury and gathers
123. Compare the conclusion in Hawkins with Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956):
"'An indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, like an information drawn
by the prosecutor, if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits. The Fifth
Amendment requires nothing more." Id at 363 (footnote omitted). Accord, Bracy v. United States,
435 U.S. 1301, 1303 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1978). See also Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214,
220 (1965) (grand jury indictment supersedes need for preliminary hearing); United States v.
Anderson, 481 F.2d 685, 691 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Le Pera, 443 F.2d 810, 811 (9h Cir.
1971); Austin v. United States, 408 F.2d 808, 810 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Conway, 415
F.2d 158, 160 (3rd Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 994 (1969); Bayless v. United States, 381 F.2d
67, 71 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v. Chase, 372 F.2d 453, 467 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S.
907 (1967); Crump v. Anderson, 352 F.2d 649, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Byrnes v. United States, 327
F.2d 825, 834 (9th Cir. 1964) (no right to a preliminary hearing after indictment). In fact, there is
no federal constitutional right to a preliminary hearing, with or without indictment. Beck v.
Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 545 (1962); Ocanapo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91, 98 (1914); Lem
Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586, 590 (1913). See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 118-19 (1975)
(preliminary hearing only required in cases of pretrial confinement). See also Harris v. Estelle, 487
F.2d 1293, 1296 (5th Cir. 1974) (no federal constitutional right to a preliminary hearing).
124. In the wake of the Costello decision, the High Court in several subsequent cases set out
the historical and constitutional values - and corresponding powers -- embodied in the grand jury.
See United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1983); Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol
Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211,218-20 (1979); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,343 (1974);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686-91 (1972); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360
U.S. 395,399400 (1959). These decisions are summarized in United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc.,
where the Court began by observing that:
The grand jury has always occupied a high place as an instrument of justice in our system
of criminal law -- so much so that it is enshrined in the Constitution. It serves the "dual
function of determining if there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been
committed and of protecting citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions." It has
always been extended extraordinary powers of investigation and great responsibility for
directing its own efforts.
Sells Engineering, 463 U.S. at 423 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted in original) (quoting
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 686-87).
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the evidence required for the jury's consideration .... [I]t depends
largely on the prosecutor's office to secure the evidence or witnesses it
requires. The prosecutor also advises the lay jury on the applicable law.
... If he considers that the law and the admissible evidence will not
support a conviction, he can be expected to advise the grand jury not to
indict. He must also examine indictments, and the basis for their
issuance, to determine whether it is in the interests of justice to proceed
with prosecution.1
25
Compared to the attitude of the majority in Hawkins, the United
States Supreme Court would seem to be naive about the
shortcomings of the grand jury system. Yet that Court, and the
federal system in general, have far longer and more extensive
experience with the grand jury system than does the California
Supreme Court, or the California system as a whole. And even the
most cynical person can hardly accuse the justices who participated
in the majority opinions cited above of being unsympathetic to civil
liberties. 126 The fact of the matter is that the federal High Court
knows whereof it speaks when it comes to the grand jury system,
and it has consistently and zealously protected it as a proven and
effective charging method.
Moreover, coming from as prominent a state as California,
Hawkins' alleged discovery of a constitutional right to a post-
indictment preliminary hearing has found remarkably little support
among its sister states. On the contrary, the vast majority of states
to have considered the issue either have determined that there is no
right to a post-indictment preliminary hearing at all, or have found
it to be purely statutory, rejecting attempts to find such a right in
their state constitutions. 2 7
125. Sells Engineering, 463 U.S. at 430 (citations and footnotes omitted).
126. For instance, Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas joined in Justice Black's opinion
for the Court in Costello, 350 U.S. at 359; and Justices Marshall and Blackman joined in Justice
Brennan's opinion for the Court in Sells Engineering, 463 U.S. at 420.
127. See Elmore v. State, 445 So. 2d 943,945-46 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983); Pascua v. State, 633
P.2d 1033, 1034 n.3 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981), overruled on other grounds, Johnson v. State, 662 P.2d
981, 984 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); State v. Meeker, 143 Ariz. 256, 265, 693 P.2d 911, 920 (1984);
People v. Dist. Court for Second Jud. Dist., 199 Colo. 398, 401, 610 P.2d 490, 492 (1980); State v.
Cobbs, 164 Conn. 402,405-06,324 A.2d 234,238 (1973) (note: Connecticut abolished the grand jury
system by state constitutional amendment in 1982. See State v. Mitchell, 200 Conn. 323, 512 A.2d
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The chief flaw of the Hawkins opinion is its presumptuousness.
It is obvious that opinions differ sharply with regard to the
advisability of prosecution by grand jury indictment. They have
differed sharply for well over a century. But, as we have seen, the
drafters of the 1879 constitution intended to maintain the system of
140 (1986)); Smith v. State, 344 A.2d 251, 253 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975); State v. Middlebrooks, 236
Ga. 52, 55, 222 S.E.2d 343, 345-46 (1976); Chung v. Ogata, 53 Haw. 364, 364-69, 493 P.2d 1342,
1343-45 (1972); People v. Kline, 92 Ill. 490, 500-01, 442 N.E.2d 154, 159 (1982) (rejecting
Hawkins); State v. Arnold, 421 A.2d 932, 935 (Me. 1980); State v. Johnson, 291 Minn. 407, 413,
192 N.W.2d 87, 91-92 (1971); Lataille v. Dist. Court of East Hampden, 366 Mass. 525, 530-31,320
N.E.2d 877, 881 (1974); Seim v. State, 95 Nev. 89,97-99, 590 P.2d 1152, 1157-58 (1979) (rejecting
Hawkins); Smith v. O'Brien, 109 N.H. 317, 251 A.2d 323-24 (1969); State v. Muise, 103 N.M. 382,
387, 707 P.2d 1192, 1197 (1985); State v. Hudson, 295 N.C. 427, 431,245 S.E.2d 686, 689 (1978);
State v. Lamp, 59 Ohio App. 2d 125, 126-27, 13 Ohio Op. 3d 173, 174, 392 N.E.2d 1090, 1092
(1977); Commonwealth v. Bestwick, 489 Pa. 603, 414 A.2d 1373, 1377-79 (1980) (rejecting
Hawkins); State v. Luna, 378 N.W.2d 229, 237 (S.D. 1985) (expressly rejecting Hawkins); State ex
reL Holmes v. Salinas, 784 S.W.2d 421, 424-25 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Titcomb v. Wyant, I Va.
App. 31, 39, 333 S.E.2d 82, 87 (1985), citing Webb v. Commonwealth, 204 Va. 24, 129 S.E.2d 22
(1963); State ex reL Rowe v. Ferguson, 268 S.E.2d 45, 47-48 n.4 (W. Va. 1980) (rejecting Hawkins);
Hennigan v. State, 746 P.2d 360, 374-76 (Wyo. 1987) (expressly rejecting Hawkins); Des Moines
Register & Tribune v. Dist. Ct., 426 N.W.2d 142, 145-46 (Iowa 1988) (rejecting the rule in Hawkins)
(no constitutional right to a post-indictment preliminary hearing). See also State v. Holmes, 388 So.
2d 722,724-25 (La. 1980); Vaughn v. State, 557 S.W.2d 64, 64-65 (Tenn. 1977); State v. Tolman,
775 P.2d 422,425-26 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Dunn, 121 Wis. 2d 389, 394, 359 N.W.2d 151, 153
(1984); State v. Sherry, 233 Kan. 920, 924-32, 667 P.2d 367, 372-77 (1983); State v. Persons, 201
N.W.2d 895, 897 (N.D. 1972) (right to preliminary hearing is purely statutory); Lovell v. State, 250
So. 2d 915,916 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971); State v. Edmonson, 113 Idaho 230, 232-36,743 P.2d 459,
461-65 (1987); King v. Venters, 595 S.W.2d 714,714-15 (Ky. 1980) (expressly rejecting Hawkins);
Thomas v. State, 50 Md. App. 286, 437 A.2d 678 (1981), relying upon Marshall v. State, 46 Md.
App. 695,420 A.2d 1266 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 291 Md. 205,434 A.2d 555 (1981); Glass
v. State, 278 So. 2d 384, 387 (Miss. 1973); State v. McGee, 757 S.W.2d 321, 325 (Mo. App. 1988);
State v. Mitchell, 164 N.J. Super. 198, 201-02, 395 A.2d 1257, 1258 (1978); People v. Johnson, 415
N.Y.S.2d 664, 606, 99 Misc. 2d 132 (1979); State v. Keenan, 278 S.C. 361, 364, 296 S.E.2d 676,
678 (1982) (no state constitutional right to a preliminary hearing). Cf Collins v. State, 561 P.2d
1373, 1383 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977) (rejecting equal protection challenge to alternative prosecution
by information or indictment); Stone v. Hope, 488 P.2d 616 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971) (finding
statutory right to post-indictment preliminary hearing). But cf State v. Freeland, 295 Or. 367, 667
P.2d 509 (1983); State v. Clark, 291 Or. 231, 630 P.2d 810 (1981) (rejecting Hawkins' requirement
of mandatory post-indictment preliminary hearing, but creating a requirement of special consistency
under state equal protection clause); People v. Duncan, 388 Mich. 489, 502, 201 N.W.2d 629, 635
(1972) (finding post-indictment preliminary hearing required by Michigan Supreme Court's
supervisory power, without addressing constitutional issues). Cf People v. Hall, 435 Mich. 599, 603,
460 N.W.2d 520, 522 (1990) (finding preliminary hearing to be -"solely ... a statutory right"'). In
summary, insofar as we can discover, only a very few states have implied a right to a post-indictment
preliminary hearing where such is not specifically required by statute, and none (with the arguable
exception of Oregon) has followed the equal protection reasoning advanced in Hawkins.
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alternative prosecution by indictment or information, leaving it up
to the legislature to amend the system. Furthermore, the events of
the decade immediately preceding Hawkins could hardly have been
clearer, in that the system had been maintained by the
Constitutional Revision Committee, approved by the voters, and
endorsed by the California Supreme Court itself, in Sirhan.
Whatever the inadequacies of "original intent" analysis, the
Hawkins opinion fairly invites Professor Levy's comment that such
an analysis is "far more preferable than the surrealistic visions,
moral reasoning, and noninterpretivism that abandon the text, its
historical origins, its Framers' intent, and the expositions of it in
their time." 1
28
Hawkins forms a fitting conclusion to our review of the
provenance and early history of our Declaration of Rights. 29 That
review shows that the criminal provisions of the Declaration which
have most frequently been given non-federal interpretations by the
state supreme court are in fact precisely those provisions which
come from the United States Constitution and were incorporated
into the state constitution in order to provide those federal
guarantees to the people vis-A-vis the state government.
Furthermore, while there certainly are provisions of distinctly non-
federal origins, these unique provisions have often been neglected
or--as in the case of the grand jury provisions--nullified by the state
supreme court. In other instances, the court has in recent times
either made a small thing of those unique provisions (as with the
jury trial provision), or it has made the wrong thing of them (as
with the "cruel or unusual punishments" clause). It is in this
context that we come to consider the chronic constitutional crisis
128. LavY, ORINAL ITENT, supra note 6, at 373-74.
129. While this Article was being prepared for publication, the California Supreme Court
handed down its ruling in Bowens v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 4th 36, 820 P.2d 600, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d
376 (1991). This case held that Proposition 115 had abrogated Hawkins by adding section 14.1 to
article I, providing that: "'If a felony is prosecuted by indictment, there shall be no post-indictment
preliminary hearing." Bowens, 1 Cal. 4th at 45-46, 820 P.2d at 605, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 382. See CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 14.1. Justice Mosk, having been the author of the Hawkins case, and other
intervening decisions, filed a long dissent.
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of the past couple of decades, as it developed under the aegis of
the independent state grounds doctrine.
PART II
DOWN THE RABBIT HOLE: Adequate and Independent State
Grounds in California, circa 1970-1990
Alice skwooched up herforehead and ventured quietly, "If he writes the
same thing, why does he do it twice?"
"Because, " said the White Rabbit, "he may write the same thing, but
it's read differently. "
-- Justice Stanley Mosk, on how to interpret the same provisions in
state and federal constitutions, differently. 3 '
"When I use a word, " Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone,
"it means just what I choose it to mean -- neither more nor less."
"The question is, " said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so
many different things. "
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master -
- that's all. "
-- Lewis Carroll, in Through the Looking-Glass.1
3
1
A. The Modern Confrontation Between the Court and the Voters
In the area of criminal procedure, the constitutional history of
the past twenty years in this state has been one of repeated
130. Stanley Mosk, The State Courts, in AMERicAN LAW: THE THIRD CENTURY: THE LAW
BIcENTENNiAL VOLUME 213, 225 (Bernard Schwartz et al. eds., 1976). Justice Mosk prefaces this
passage with the following introduction: "Why do we have two sets of constitutions -- federal and
state -- in this one nation? Perhaps an answer can be found in this mythical quotation from Alice in
Wonderland." Ia (footnote omitted).
131. L. CARROLL, THROUGH Tim LOOKIN-GLASS 131 (1865 & reprint St. Martin's Press
1977).
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confrontation between the state supreme court and California
voters. Typically, these "showdowns" were provoked when the
court fastened upon a provision of the Declaration of Rights which
was virtually identical to a corresponding provision of the federal
constitution. The court would extol the "independent vitality" of
the state constitution and then construe the provision in question in
a manner in which it had never been interpreted before and
contrary to the United States Supreme Court's recent interpretations
of the parallel federal provision and to its own prior precedents. In
fact, before 1970 the California Supreme Court had generally
followed federal law as a matter of course. It should therefore
come as no surprise that the California Supreme Court's first
departure from previously-followed federal law usually came
precisely in these recent, independent state grounds cases. This
circumstance caused the California Declaration of Rights to assume0
the appearance of a sort of "escape clause" for those seeking to
avoid the consequences of United States Supreme Court decisions.
Among the most controversial in this regard were those
instances in which the United States Supreme Court overruled the
California court's interpretation based on the federal constitution,
only to have the state court belatedly espouse the "independent
vitality" of the state provision, thereby avoiding the authority of
the federal High Court.'32 The California court also resorted to
132. See, e.g., People v. Ramos, 30 Cal. 3d 553,591-96,639 P.2d 908, 930-33, 180 Cal. Rptr.
266,288-91 (1982) (holding so-called Briggs Instruction in death penalty cases unconstitutional under
the federal due process clause and Eighth Amendment), overruled in California v. Ramos, 463 U.S.
992 (1983), on remand, People v. Ramos, 37 Cal. 3d 136, 151-55, 689 P.2d 430, 438-41, 207 Cal.
Rptr. 800, 808-11 (1984) (holding that the Briggs Instruction was unconstitutional under the state due
process clause); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 617-19, 487 P.2d 1241, 1264-66,96 Cal. Rptr. 601,
624-26 (1971) [hereinafter, Serrano 1] (holding the state school financing system unconstitutional
under the federal equal protection clause), abrogated by San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 44-53 (1973) (holding a similar financing system constitutional under federal equal
protection clause),followed by Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 762, 774-76, 557 P.2d 929, 949,
957-58, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 365, 373-74 (1976) (acknowledging that San Antonio undercut Serrano
I, but holding the state financing system unconstitutional understate equal protection clause); People
v. Green, 70 Cal. 2d 654, 665, 451 P.2d 422, 429, 75 Cal. Rptr. 782, 789 (1969) (finding
consideration of prior inconsistent statements for substantive purposes unconstitutional under federal
confrontation clause), rev'd in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), followed by People v.
Chavez, 26 Cal. 3d 334, 357, 605 P.2d 401,415, 161 Cal. Rptr. 762, 776 (1980) (rejecting the Green
rule on the basis of the state confrontation clause); Diamond v. Bland, 3 Cal. 3d 653, 665-66, 477
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basing its decision upon both federal and state constitutional
grounds, rendering effective review, either by the United States
Supreme Court or by California voters, extraordinarily difficult.
133
Within the legal community, these approaches subjected the court
to criticism that it was seeking to insulate itself from review by the
United States Supreme Court,13 ' by means of "constitution
shopping."' 135 Even -supporters of the independent state grounds
approach have admitted to considerable discomfort over these
adventures in legal creativity.'36 On the court itself, dissenters
from the majority's approach responded with everything from
acerbic remarks 137 to long and learned historical essays, reproving
the majority.
138
Whatever the truth of the accusations that the court was seeking
to insulate itself from review by the federal Supreme Court, the
P.2d 733, 741, 91 Cal. Rptr. 501,509 (1970) (holding limitation upon solicitation at shopping center
unconstitutional under federal First Amendment), abrogated by Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551,
570 (1972) (holding such limitations did not violate the federal First Amendment), followed by
Diamond v. Bland, 11 Cal. 3d 331,335, 521 P.2d 460, 463, 113 Cal. Rptr. 468,471 (1974) (adopting
the federal rule from Tanner); Diamond itself was overruled in Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center,
23 Cal. 3d 899, 910, 592 P.2d 341, 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860 (1979) (holding limitations upon
solicitation at shopping centers unconstitutional based upon the state constitutional rights of free
speech and petition).
133. See, e.g., People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 275-76, 545 P.2d 1333, 1340-41, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 629, 636-37 (1976) (requiring arrest warrant for arrest in home absent exigent circumstances);
People v. Scott, 16 Cal. 3d 242, 250,546 P.2d 327, 332-33, 128 Cal. Rptr. 39,44-45 (1976) (limiting
pat-down searches).
134. See Van de Kamp & Gerry, Reforming the Exclusionary Rule: An Analysis of Two
Proposed Amendments to the California Constitution, 33 HASTINGS LJ. 1109, 1124-26 (1982);
Deukmejian & Thompson, All Sail and No Anchor--Judicial Review Under the California
Constitution, 6 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 975, 989 (1979); Bice, supra note 79 passim. See also
Hudnut, State Constitutions and Individual Rights: The Case for Judicial Restraint, 63 DENv. U. L.
REV. 85, 106-07 (1985) [hereinafter Hudnut, State Constitutions]; Welsh, Reconsidering the
Constitutional Relationship Between State and Federal Courts: A Critique of Michigan v. Long, 59
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1118, 1126-28 (1984). See also In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921,946,569 P.2d
1286, 1301, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298, 313 (1977) (Clark, J., dissenting) (stating that -No court should
presume that it is so immune from error that it may foreclose every means of challenging its
decisions").
135. Deukmejian & Thompson, supra note 134, at 989.
136. Grodin, Some Reflections, supra note 23, at 398-99.
137. See, e.g., People v. Pettingill, 21 Cal. 3d 231,254,578 P.2d 108, 122, 145 Cal. Rptr. 861,
875 (1978) (Justice Clark accusing the majority of playing a "shell game" with the state and federal
constitutions).
138. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 584, 610-19, 586 P.2d 916, 933-39, 150
Cal. Rptr. 435, 452-58 (1978) (Richardson, J., dissenting).
1235
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 23
insulation has repeatedly proven itself to be ineffective. Indeed, the
primary effect of the "independent state grounds" decisions in the
criminal procedure area was to leave the California Supreme Court
"out in the cold" with the people of this state, who undertook to
accomplish what the United States Supreme Court would or could
not, by rejecting the California court's innovations through the
extraordinary and costly means of popular initiatives. In the
following pages, we review the history of the independent state
grounds doctrine as practiced by the California Supreme Court, and
the responses by the voters rejecting the court's innovations. We
find that the lessons of these showdowns affirm the general
conclusion of Part I. As they did at our state constitutional
conventions of the last century, so also in recent decades, the
people of this State have generally supported the federal
interpretation of criminal procedural rights.
If one criminal case were to be chosen as the opening salvo in
the confrontation between the voters and the court, it would
probably be People v. Anderson'39 in 1972. In that case, the court
rejected its own long-standing precedent as well as the rulings of
the United States Supreme Court and held the death penalty
unconstitutional as violating the provision of the California
Declaration prohibiting "cruel or unusual punishments. ' 140 We
have already addressed Justice Wright's attempt to anchor the
decision in the "or" of "cruel or unusual punishments., 141 The
remainder of the majority opinion consists essentially in an effort
to justify the abandonment of a century of precedent on the
grounds that present moral standards had evolved beyond previous,
less enlightened views. In other words, as a society we have
progressed and learned to recognize that capital punishment "is
incompatible with the dignity of man and the judicial
process., 14 2 Thus, the court seemed to assert that it was merely
acknowledging the emergence of an enlightened consensus by
139. 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972).
140. Idl at 656, 493 P.2d at 899, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 77-85.
142. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d at 656, 493 P.2d at 899, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
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abolishing the death penalty. There was one very obvious defect to
this argument: it reflected the moral commitments of the majority
of the court itself, rather than of the majority of the electorate. In
1972, as today, most people favored the death penalty. Having
failed to persuade the voters regarding this issue, the court instead
threw down a gauntlet: "Public acceptance of capital punishment
is a relevant but not controlling factor in assessing whether it is
consonant with contemporary standards of decency." 43
The response was foreseeable enough. The "public," with near-
record speed, passed a popular initiative in 1974 amending article
I, section 27. The amendment resurrected the death penalty and
required that the court hue to the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court in its interpretation of the "cruel and/or unusual
punishments" clause as applied to the death penalty."4 Regardless
of how one may feel about this particular issue, this exchange
between the supreme court and the voters could have had a positive
outcome. The court could have acknowledged that it is an integral,
albeit unique, part of the democratic process of this state, not an
entity apart from and "above it all." The court could then have
carried on, not as an engine of constitutional power, but as a
"generator of consent" 145--that is, as a persuader to the legal
community and educator of the community as a whole.
For their part, the people of this state can act as potent sources
of democratic legitimacy for decisions of the court. As Justice
Robert Utter of the Washington Supreme Court has observed:
Popular reaction to state court decisions is inevitable, whether viewed
as a positive phenomenon, enlightening the courts on deeply held
popular values, or whether seen negatively, threatening judicial
independence. If the supporters of unpopular jurisprudence perceive that
public backlash stems from misunderstandings of the law, then they
may consider how to better educate the public. 46
143. kd at 648, 493 P.2d at 893, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 165.
144. See CAL CONsT. art. I, § 27.
145. See A. BIcKEL, THE MoRArry OF CONSENT 15 (1975).
146. Utter, State Constitutional Law, the United States Supreme Court, and Democratic
Accountability: Is There a Crocodile in the Bathtub?, 64 WASH. L. Rav. 19, 48 (1989).
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As Justice Utter also emphasizes, rather than constituting a
threat to judicial independence, the voters, by supporting their
judiciary at the polls, or by passing constitutional amendments
affirming state court opinions, can add great authority to the
jurisprudence of that state court--and, in the process, provide a
model for the United States Supreme Court, notably on issues of
national consequence which that Court has yet to decide.
147
In any case, it was not to be. By 1974, the court had already
headed down the road of remaking the state's criminal procedure
in reliance upon "independent state grounds," apparently oblivious
to the political resistance it was engendering. The stage was set for
the build-up to the next great explosion--"Prop. 8."
B. "Adequate and Independent State Grounds": Neither "State,"
Nor "Independent"--Nor Adequate Grounds
The independent state grounds doctrine in California as it has
been used to depart from United States Supreme Court holdings by
relying on the California Declaration of Rights, is of recent vintage
and shallow draft. In the criminal area, the modem doctrine only
fully emerged about 20 years ago, with the exception of a single
line of cases addressing double jeopardy. 148 Moreover, as it has
developed since then, it is the handiwork of just a few justices.
Indeed, it is largely the work of Justice Stanley Mosk.
149
147. Id at 46-47.
148. See People v. Compton, 6 Cal. 3d 55, 58, 490 P.2d 537, 538, 98 Cal. Rptr. 217, 218
(1971); Curry v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 707, 716, 470 P.2d 345, 350, 87 Cal. Rptr. 361, 366
(1970); Cardenas v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 273,275-76, 363 P.2d 889, 891, 14 Cal. Rptr. 657,
659 (1961) (rejecting recent holding in Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961), in favor of
reliance upon the California double jeopardy clause).
149. As shall transpire below, many if not most of the major "'independent state grounds"
opinions were authored by Justice Mosk. In the earlier years, his place was sometimes taken by Chief
Justice Wright (as in Anderson) or Justice Tobriner. After their departures, theirsupporting roles were
often assumed by Chief Justice Bird and Justice Grodin. But there can be no doubt that Justice Mosk
was the "chief architect of independent state grounds in California." Uelman, Commentary: Are We
Reprising a Finale or an Overture?, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 2069, 2070 (1988). See Goldberg, Stanley
Mosk: A Federalistfor the 1980's, 12 HAsTiNcS CONST. LQ. 395 (1985) (endorsing Justice Mosk's
application of independent state grounds).
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In addition to being of recent and narrow origins, the
independent state grounds doctrine of the past two decades has
been essentially a reactive or (to cite the strong terminology of
Professor Ronald Collins) "reactionary" exercise. 50 It has had
little independent existence, but commonly comes into play when
provoked by federal decisions. In other words, the California
Supreme Court has turned to the Declaration of Rights when
particular United States Supreme Court decisions contradicted the
view of the majority of the state court, and seldom otherwise. Thus,
one of the many paradoxical aspects of this area of law is that our
"independent state" doctrines are in large measure of distinctly
federal origin: In many cases, both the California rule and the
federal rule which it was designed to obviate were based squarely
upon United States Supreme Court precedent.
151
Usually, this state of affairs came about either because the
California court had adopted a rule directly from the United States
Supreme Court, or because it had frankly sought to predict the
federal rule in cases of first-impression. The federal High Court
would then extend or restrict--some would say "change"--the
federal rule, or, in the first-impression situation, adopt a rule
contrary to what the California court predicted. It is only in such
circumstances that the California Supreme Court has typically
discovered the "independence" of our state constitution. The
California high court would then use the state charter as a vehicle
for retaining its original rule--a rule which, as just noted, was itself
adopted precisely because it was believed to be the federal
rule. 152
150. See Collins, Reliance on State Constittifons-Away From a Reactionary Approach, 9
HASTINGs CONST. L.Q. 1 (1981).
151. The independent state grounds doctrine, itself, is of course also of federal origin, being
at least a century old. See generally Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
152. Often, "independent state grounds" cases are punctuated with a reference to section 24
of the Declaration. Section 24 of the Declaration, before it was amended by Proposition 115 in 1990,
provided simply that: "Rights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed
by the United States Constitution." Text of Proposed Law, in VoTERs PAMPHLET, supra note 110,
at 72. This is, of course, a statement of fact, just as the observation that "the United States
Constitution is the supreme law of the land," as set forth in Article II, section 1, of the California
Constitution, is a statement of fact. But it'does not follow from these propositions that any particular
provision of the California Constitution ought to be interpreted, respectively, differentfrom the federal
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These incongruous origins of the alleged "independent vitality"
of the state constitution have in turn encouraged both the state
supreme court and sympathetic commentators to engage in
exercises in the retrospective rewriting of history, whereby the
federal origins of the rule were all but forgotten and the
"independent state origins" of the state rule lauded and projected
into the past. This selective forgetfulness in turn provided several
important props of legitimacy for the court's departure from its
prior common commitment to the applicable federal rule. First, by
ignoring the federal provenance of the original rule, the court could
rationalize that, rather than departing from its previous practice
(abiding by the federal rule), it was merely maintaining its
independent state rule, in the face of a departure by the United
States Supreme Court. Second, it gives the impression that the
novel state-constitutional rule has historically genuine state roots--
roots which actually were federal. Third, with each new case, this
approach could be used to bolster the legitimacy of using the
independent state grounds doctrine in the next case, and so to
suggest that the origins of that doctrine were much deeper than
they in fact were.
A systematic review of the independent state grounds doctrine,
as practiced by the California Supreme Court, lies beyond the
scope of this Article. Instead, we will concentrate upon one of the
central foci of the controversy that led to Proposition 8--namely,
the exclusionary rule--to illustrate the patterns described generally
above.
constitution, or the same as the federal constitution. In fact, all that these statements amount to is an
affirmation that we live in a federal system. See infra text accompanying notes 198-205. As Justice
Mosk has acknowledged, "'this declaration of constitutional independence did not originate at that
recent election; indeed the voters were told the provision was a mere reaffirmation of existing law."
People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 551,531 P.2d 1099, 1114, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 330 (1975), In
the interest of accuracy, it should be noted that "this declaration of constitutional independence"
actually did originate at "that recent election," in 1974. See VoTmRs PAMPHLET, supra note 110.
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The exclusionary rule was first adopted by the California
Supreme Court in People v. Cahan153 in 1955. At that time, the
rule was not yet required of the states pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment--but it had applied in the federal system since the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Weeks v. United
States'54 over forty years before Cahan. Justice Traynor, writing
for the court, set out systematically to adopt that federal rule into
California law on the same basis as had the federal High Court. He
first noted the peculiar nature of the federal rule: 'the federal
exclusionary rule,' in the words of Justice Black, 'is not a
command of the Fourth Amendment but is a judicially created rule
of evidence which Congress might negate.""' 55 Then, the court
reviewed both federal and state law and set the stage for adoption
of the exclusionary rule, as follows:
[P]ursuant to the suggestion of the United States Supreme Court, we
have reconsidered the rule we have heretofore followed that the
unconstitutional methods by which evidence is obtained does not affect
its admissibility and have carefully weighed the various arguments that
have been advanced for and against that rule.... [W]hatever rule we
adopt, whether it excludes or admits the evidence, will be a judicially
declared rule of evidence.
156
Justice Traynor then proceeded carefully to analyze and quote
from United States Supreme Court cases supporting the
exclusionary rule and announced the court's decision to adopt the
rule as a "judicially declared rule of evidence" --just as was the
federal rule.
57
153. 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
154. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
155. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d at 440,282 P.2d at 908 (quoting wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,39-40
(1949) (Black, J., concurring)).
156. ld. at 442, 282 P.2d at 909-10.
157. l Although Justice Traynor noted the obvious fact that this was a California rule and that
the court was not obligated to follow in every detail the federal application of the rule, the court
certainly indicated no unhappiness with the federal rule as it then stood. See id. at 450-51, 282 P.2d
at 914-15.
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The same year as Cahan, the court adopted the vicarious
exclusionary rule in People v. Martin.158 It is ironic that this rule,
which would become a source of great controversy in California,
was adopted only after an explicit and meticulous effort to
demonstrate that it was the federal rule. Certainly, this was no easy
task, since the law in the lower federal courts was to the contrary.
Nonetheless, Justice Traynor, again writing for the court, was at
pains to show that a careful analysis of then-recent United States
Supreme Court decisions implied that the vicarious rule was
required by a proper understanding of those cases. It was on that
basis that the California court adopted the vicarious exclusionary
rule.
159
This is the case background to the first, true application of the
"independent state grounds" doctrine in this area of law, which
took place in direct reaction to the United States Supreme Court's
1969 decision in Alderman v. United States."6 In that case the
federal High Court determined, contrary to Martin, that:
[S]uppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be
successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the
search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely by the introduction
of damaging evidence.
161
In other words, there was no federally-sanctioned vicarious
exclusionary rule--thereby cutting the ground out from under the
Martin decision. The California Supreme Court first confronted the
fate of the Martin rule in Kaplan v. Superior Court162 in 1971.
Justice Mosk, writing for the majority, managed to avoid directly
tackling the issue by both sticking to the rule in Martin and
declining to rule on either federal or state constitutional grounds.
Instead, the majority asserted that, "even though the Martin rule
may not be 'required by' the prevailing federal interpretation of the
158. 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955).
159. Id at 760-61, 290 P.2d at 857.
160. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
161. Id at 171-72.
162. 6 Cal. 3d 150, 491 P.2d 1, 98 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1971).
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Fourth Amendment (Alderman v. United States), it is at least
'based on' the constitutionally compelled Cahan and Mapp [v.
Ohio 63] principles."'" In other words, the court definitely was
not relying upon the California Constitution, nor was it following
the United States Supreme Court, but it was nonetheless coming to
its conclusion, contrary to the federal rule, 'based on'..
constitutionally compelled . . . principles." This is an untenable
argument, and it certainly did not convince the three concurring
justices, whose spokesman was Justice Burke:
I concur in the result ... only under compulsion of the "vicarious
exclusionary rule" adopted in People v. Martin .... [The majority
reaffirm Martin solely upon the basis of their own preferences regarding
the scope of the exclusionary rule, and have abandoned further reliance
upon federal constitutional principles, as defined by the United States
Supreme Court. In view of the apparent need for uniform standards in
the search and seizure area, I deem such a course improvident.
165
Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court delayed express
admission that it had "abandoned . . . federal constitutional
principles" until 1975--fully two decades after Cahan and Martin.
The court finally crossed the Rubicon in People v. Brisendine.'66
Once again, the court was split four to three, with Justice Mosk
writing for the majority and Justice Burke for the opposition. In
support of the "independent vitality of our state constitution," the
majority relied in the first instance upon People v. Superior Court
(Simon),167 a 1972 case. But, as Justice Burke points out in his
163. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
164. Kaplan, 6 Cal. 3d at 161, 491 P.2d at 8, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 656 (partial citation deleted).
165. Mat at 162, 491 P.2d at 8, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 656 (Burke, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
166. 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975). The issue in Brisendine was
the permissible scope of a search upon arrest for a citation offense. As discussed below, in 1972, the
California Supreme Court had limited the scope of such a search, interpreting the federal Fourth
Amendment. People v. Superior Court (Simon), 7 Cal. 3d 186, 203-04, 496 P.2d 1205, 1218, 101
Cal. Rptr. 837, 850 (1972). The next year, the United States Supreme Court came to the contrary
conclusion in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), and in Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S.
260 (1973). This set up the confrontation in Brisendine.
167. 7 Cal. 3d 186, 496 P.2d 1205, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1972). The original case citation did
not include real party in interest, Simon. In order to avoid confusion to other similar cites, we have
added Simon to this citation.
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dissent, Simon is a federally-based case which never so much as
mentions the California Constitution:
The majority seeks to avoid the impact of those United States Supreme
Court decisions by now declaring that Simon, which mentions only the
Fourth Amendment of the federal Constitution, was in fact based on our
state constitutional provision against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 1
68
Undeterred, the majority opinion quoted Chief Justice Wright
for the proposition that '"[o]n at least one occasion, however, we
have expressly departed from the federal rule to afford defendants
a broader security against unreasonable searches and seizures than
that required by the Supreme Court. (See People v. Martin (1955)
45 Cal.2d 755, 759-761 [290 P.2d 855] [vicarious exclusionary
rule].)""' 69 Of course, this statement is quite wrong. As discussed
above, the exercise in Martin was exactly not to depart from the
true federal rule but to figure out what it was and to act
accordingly.
Next, the court cites to the Cahan and Kaplan cases for their
supposed support for a distinct state constitutional rule:
Cahan itself was decided six years before the exclusionary rule was
made binding on the states in Mapp v. Ohio .... Our vicarious
exclusionary rule has never been required under the Fourth Amendment
[citation to Alderman] but has been a continuing feature of California
law under our ability to impose higher standards for searches and
seizures than compelled by the federal Constitution. (Kaplan v. Superior
Court... ).
The foregoing cases illustrate the incontrovertible conclusion that the
California Constitution is, and always has been, a document of
independent force.
170
168. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d at 555, 531 P.2d at 1116, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 332 (Burke, J.,
dissenting).
169. Id at 549, 531 P.2d at 1112, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 328 (quoting People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d
884, 892 n.5, 506 P.2d 232, 237 n.5, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408, 413 n.5 (1973)).
170. Id at 549-50, 531 P.2d at 1112-13, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 328-29 (footnote omitted).
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Now, Cahan certainly did come down six years before Mapp,
but we have seen that it also came down over a generation after
Weeks, from which our exclusionary rule was actually derived. As
for Kaplan, it is extraordinarily unclear what the basis of that
decision was, but it is clear that it was not the California
Constitution. So, it is hard to see how either case contributes to
that constitution's "independent force." Having reached this
"incontrovertible conclusion," the court went on to assert that:
Any other result would contradict . .. the historic bases of state
charters. It is a fiction too long accepted that provisions in state
constitutions textually identical to the Bill of Rights were intended to
mirror their federal counterpart. The lesson of history is otherwise: the
Bill of Rights was based upon the corresponding provisions of the first
state constitutions, rather than the reverse.
1 7 1
Without getting into all-encompassing claims regarding "state
constitutions," these vague assertions, coming in the present
context, are misleading. The issue in Brisendine was the California
Declaration's search and seizure provision. We have shown above
that the California search and seizure clause was consciously and
carefully crafted precisely to "mirror" the federal counterpart.172
Furthermore, the federal search and seizure provision in the Fourth
Amendment was not "based upon" the provisions of prior state
constitutions. As noted above, "[t]he ideas comprising the Fourth
Amendment reversed rather than formalized colonial
precedents.' ' 173 By establishing that warrants may issue but only
upon probable cause, the Fourth Amendment broke ground such as
no state constitution had done previously. The fact is that the legal
history, both recent and constitutional, in Brisendine is
accomplished mostly "with smoke and mirrors." Far from showing
the "independent vitality" of the California Constitution, it
171. Id at 550, 531 P.2d at 1113, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 329 (emphasis added).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
173. LEvy, OgiaiNAL INTENT, supra note 6, at 224 (quoting William Cuddihy, The Fourth
Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning, chapt. 7 (Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School,
manuscript-then-in-progress)). See supra note 61.
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documents the dependency of the independent state grounds
doctrine, as practiced by the California Supreme Court, upon prior
federal jurisprudence.
Within the following year, the court twice extended the scope
of the California search and seizure clause in reliance upon
Brisendine,'74 and then used Brisendine as the basis for extending
the independent state grounds doctrine to the Miranda rule in
People v. Disbrow:1
7 1
In People v. Brisendine .... we conducted an extended analysis of the
question [of independent state grounds] and concluded that "the
California Constitution is, and always has been, a document of
independent force." We do not propose to repeat that discussion here
except to note that we continue to adhere to the views expressed
therein, and apply them in the case at bar.
176
Disbrow represented the ultimate adoption of "independent
state grounds" in the Miranda area; as such, it was preceded by a
development similar to (if more publicly convoluted than) that in
search and seizure law. As in the search and seizure area, the
California Supreme Court had adopted the Miranda rule in People
v. Fioritto,'77 in an opinion by Justice Mosk, on expressly federal
grounds. 78 Three years later, the United States Supreme Court
held in Harris v. New York 179 that statements taken in violation
of Miranda could be used for impeachment purposes. This undercut
174. People v. Norman, 14 Cal. 3d 929, 538 P.2d 237, 123 Cal. Rptr. 109 (1975) (regarding
the permitted scope of searches incident to arrest); People v. Longwill, 14 Cal. 3d 943,952,538 P.2d
753, 758-59, 123 Cal. Rptr. 297, 302-03 (1975) (holding that full body searches of individuals
arrested for public intoxication are prohibited until they are actually to be incarcerated).
175. 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976).
176. Id. at 115, 545 P.2d at 281, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
177. 68 Cal. 2d 714, 441 P.2d 625, 68 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1968).
178. As the court in Fioritro stated at the outset of its opinion: "We conclude that under the
explicit directives of Miranda defendant's confession was inadmissible .. .- Id at 716, 441 P.2d
at 626, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
179. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
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the rationale of Fioritto, much as Alderman had done to Martin.
The next year, with Justice Mosk again writing for the majority, a
deeply split court confronted this issue in People v. Taylor.180
The court managed to avoid Harris by narrowing that very broadly
written opinion practically to its facts and resurrecting prior United
States Supreme Court precedent of dubious application."' Thus,
whereas in Kaplan, the court claimed to be following the federal
constitution while not abiding by the federal Supreme Court's
interpretation of it, in Taylor the California court insisted that it
was following the federal High Court, while departing from federal
law.
The worm turned again in 1974, when the California court
expressly and very broadly "adopted" the rule in Harris, in People
v. Nudd'12--this tim6 over a strong dissent by Justice Mosk,
joined by two other justices. Nudd was itself decided less than two
years before Justice Mosk wrote the majority opinion for the court
in Disbrow, which repudiated Harris and overruled Nudd, also by
a vote of 4 to 3.13
180. 8 Cal. 3d 174, 501 P.2d 918, 104 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1972). It seems clear that the
ambivalence of the court was at a high point during the period of 1971-1973. Not only was the court
split almost evenly on the issue of whether to support or resist the recent opinions of the Burger
Court, but even the resisters were confused as to how such resistance should be carried out. The
result was opinions such as Kaplan and Taylor, which are so unconvincing that even their authors
abandoned them sub silentio after the independent state grounds doctrine had developed to an extent
which would give them another avenue of escape from the federal High Court. Furthermore, the
rhetorical weakness of these opinions and consequent controversy they aroused were only exacerbated
by strong dissenting opinions.
181. Md at 184-85, 501 P.2d at 924-25, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 356-57. As one commentator wrote
at the time:
That the seemingly broad holding in Harris would be so easily distinguished ... seemed
improbable, if not impossible. It seems likely that had Taylor been before the United
States Supreme Court the result would have been different. . . . Beyond a doubt,
defendants, prosecutors and trial judges are facing a difficult task reconciling the various
decisions and ascertaining when impeachment use of illegally obtained evidence is or is
not permissible.
Roof, Recent Decisions, 6 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 429, 435-436 (1973) (footnote omitted).
182. 12 Cal. 3d 204, 207-208, 524 P.2d 844, 846, 115 Cal. Rptr. 372, 374 (1974).
183. The particular reversal from Nudd to Disbrow occurred solely because Chief Justice
Wright switched sides. Although Justice Burke retired in 1974, between Nudd and Disbrow, his place
was taken by Justice Richardson, whose views regarding the independent state grounds doctrine were
very similar to Justice Burke's. In fact, Justice Richardson would become the leading opponent of
that doctrine on the court.
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In light of Nudd, it was impossible for the majority in Disbrow
to distinguish Harris in an even remotely persuasive manner. But,
as noted above, by the time of Disbrow (1976), the court's opinion
in Brisendine had embraced the independent state grounds doctrine.
So once again applauding the "independent nature of the California
Constitution, ' '1s4 the California Supreme Court set about
abandoning the court's previous adoption of federal law, while
actually relying upon federal law to accomplish it. The court
emphasizes the "history" set forth in Brisendine, as well as the
Fioritto and Taylor cases (both, as noted, expressly federal in their
underpinnings). 18 5 And it devotes much of the opinion in Disbrow
to a lengthy analysis of United States Supreme Court cases,
particularly Miranda itself--the point of which seems to have been
to show that the California court was merely abiding by what the
federal Court "really meant" in Miranda.
Repeated reversals from true course, such as in this line of
cases--running from Fioritto to Taylor to Nudd to Disbrow--were
bound to damage the standing and moral authority of the court in
the eyes of the public and the legal community. Far from reflecting
any rational development of law, these cases suggest the shifting
coalitions amongst the justices during this period. Furthermore, as
was the case in Brisendine, there is no effort to establish any
special interest on the part of California (or of the states in general)
in having a rule different from the federal rule. Nor did the
majority of the California court make any notable effort to explain
why it was reversing its own very recent holding in Nudd.
These are exactly the sort of developments that provoked
Proposition 8. As Justice Richardson, writing for the three
dissenting justices in Disbrow, warned presciently:
..The persuasion of the United States Supreme Court decisions is
particularly strong in the area of search and seizure and the exclusionary
rule. California courts have for years spoken of the basis of the
exclusionary rule as the Fourth Amendment. A sudden switch to a
184. People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d, 101, 114, 545 P.2d 272, 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 368
(1976).
185. lId at 109-15, 545 P.2d at 278-81,127 Cal. Rptr. at 365-69.
1248
1992 / Use and Abuse of the California Declaration of Rights
California ground to avoid the impact of federal high court decision
invites the successful use of the initiative process to overrule the
California decision with its concomitant harm to the prestige, influence,
and function of the judicial branch of state government."'
18 6
C. Periphrasis: Recent Revisions to the California Constitution
It would be premature to address the consequences of this next
act without considering, at least in a general way, the constitutional
revisions carried out in California in the 1960's and 1970's. This
digression is called for for a couple of reasons -- one general, the
other specific.
First, it serves to underline the fact that reasoned constitutional
reform does not--and, in recent times, has not -- depended upon the
state supreme court. Perhaps because it is so difficult to amend the
federal constitution, it is easy to slip into the notion that the state
supreme court was the only institution which could have
measurably altered our criminal procedure, and that it was therefore
legitimate--if not altogether laudable--for the court to embrace the
novelties of constitutional interpretation such as it did during the
last two decades. The fundamental weakness of this argument is
that even before the period in which the "independent state
grounds" argument seriously emerged, Californians had embarked
upon a thorough revision of their constitution without the help of
the state high court.8 7
This process began with the passage of Proposition 7 in 1962
and the subsequent creation of a Constitutional Revision Committee
to accomplish the reform. The Committee, which consisted of
representatives of many different groups, labored for over a decade.
It revised the entire state constitution and presented its revisions to
the voters in a series of popular initiatives. The revisions to the
186. lal at 118-19, 545 P.2d at 283, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 371 (Richardson, J., dissenting) (quoting
People v. Norman, 14 Cal. 3d 929, 940-42, 538 P.2d 237, 246, 123 Cal. Rptr. 109, 118 (1975)
(Clark, J., dissenting)) (Justice Clark adopted much of the opinion of Justice Thompson of the District
Court of Appeal).
187. See Hyink, California Revises its Constitution, 22 W. PoL. Q. 637-54 (1969) (regarding
the Proposition 7 of 1962 and its aftermath, as discussed below).
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Declaration of Rights were embodied in another Proposition 7 on
the November, 1974 ballot. These recommendations resulted in
many of the stylistic changes to provisions of the Declaration of
Rights, which we have noted above.'88 But, the Commission also
made changes to the Declaration which it regarded--and justified
to the voters--as substantive modifications or additions to the
Declaration.
This leads us to the second, specific justification for our
digression. The Commission discussed these changes in its own
reports. They also explained and justified them to the voters in the
California Voters Pamphlet, a publication compiled by the
California Secretary of State and sent to all registered voters. 189
The Voters Pamphlet includes the texts of initiatives, a professional
legislative analysis of each, and brief statements for and against
them. Such Pamphlets have long been regarded as basic sources for
judicial interpretation of the intent of the drafters of a referendum
or initiative, as well as the intentions of the voters in enacting
it.19
0
The 1974 Constitutional Revision Initiative (Proposition 7)
makes clear that one of the main intentions was to adopt and
incorporate the federal "due process" and "equal protection"
188. The Commission was generally careful to note when its changes were substantive, and
when merely stylistic. See CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTONAL REVISION COMMISSION, PROPOSED
REVISION OF ARict.E I, ARicL. XX, ARxTct XXII oF Tm CALIFORNIA CoNsTUI.MoN 17-33
(1971).
189. See generally VOTERS PAMPHLE, supra note 110.
190. See, e.g., Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d492,504,816 P.2d 1309,1315,286 Cal. Rptr. 283,
289 (1991) (stating that the analysis and arguments in the ballot pamphlet are indicia of the voters'
intent); Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208,
245-46,583 P.2d 1281, 1300, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 258 (1978). See also Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v.
State Bd. of Equalization, 53 Cal. 3d 245,250,806 P.2d 1360, 1363,279 Cal. Rptr. 325, 328 (1991);
In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 889 n.9, 694 P.2d 744, 754 n.9, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631, 641 n.9 (1985);
Pacific Legal Foundation v. Brown, 29 Cal. 3d 168, 182-83, 624 P.2d 1215, 1222-23, 172 Cal. Rptr.
487, 494-95 (1981); People ex reL Dept. Pub. Wks. v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 206, 212, 436 P.2d
342, 346, 65 Cal. Rptr. 342, 346 (1968); Barrett v. Hite, 61 Cal. 2d 103, 106, 389 P.2d 944, 946, 37
Cal. Rptr. 320, 322 (1964) (relying upon ballot pamphlets to interpret intent of initiative or
referendum). In the case of Proposition 7 in 1974, the conclusions of the Legislative Analyst were
actually incorporated into the Report to the Legislature, regarding the work of the Constitutional
Revision Commission. See JoINT RULEs CoMMrrrm, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, REPORT ON
MATERIALS OF CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION RELATING TO PROVISIONS IN CALIFORNIA
CONSTmITIoN RECOMMENDED OR ENDORSED BY COMMISSION 75-76 (1974).
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rights into the California Declaration of Rights, as well as the
"establishment" clause of the federal First Amendment. As it was
stated by the Legislative Analyst:
Federal Rights in State Constitution. The proposition puts the
following three rights into the State Constitution. These rights presently
are contained in the federal Constitution.
(a) The Legislature shall make no law respecting the establishment
of religion.
(b) A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.
(c) A person may not be denied equal protection of the laws.
91
In support of the Proposition, the Chairman of the Constitution
Revision Commission wrote in the Pamphlet:
Proposition 7 revises Article 1 of the California Constitution by
removing material that has been declared unconstitutional, or is not of
constitutional importance. Proposition 7 contains all rights presently
enjoyed by Californians and places in our State Constitution some of the
rights enjoyed by Californians as citizens of the United States, but
which are not presently in our State Constitution. For example,
Proposition 7 adds to our Constitution the right of all Californians to
due process of law .... 192
191. Legislative Analyst, Analysis, in VOTRS PAMPHLE, supra note 110, at 26. There is one
obvious anomaly here. The California Declaration of Rights had always had a "due process" clause,
which is worded for all practical purposes identically with subsection '(b).' In fact, a glance at page
71 of the Pamphlet, showing the text of the proposed additions and eliminations to the Declaration,
shows the former "'due process" clause stricken out in section 13. Whatever the logic may have
been, it is clear that the Constitutional Revision Commission intended to model the due process right
in the California constitution upon the federal right.
192. l at 28. The 1974 revision was thorough-going and not limited to the positive additions
as set forth above. It also made changes which the Legislative Analyst described as follows:
Rights of Persons Accused of Crime. Presently the State Constitution gives specific
rights to persons accused of crime. This proposition adds the following:
(1) The accused person has the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.
(2) The accused person has a right to have the assistance of a lawyer.
(3) The accused person has a right to be personally present with a lawyer at the trial.
(4) If the accused person does not understand English, he has the right to an
interpreter.
(5) Instead of being released on bail prior to trial, the accused person may be
released on his or her own recognizance at the discretion of the court.
1251
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 23
Thus, a general point of the revisions of the Declaration was to
bring the criminal provisions of the California Declaration of
Rights into closer accord with the United States Constitution as
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. By so doing, the
revision followed in the tradition of the constitutional conventions
of 1849 and 1879.
D. The Aftermath of Proposition 8
The great public controversy generated by the "independent
state grounds" cases such as Brisendine and Disbrow led the voters
in 1982 to pass Proposition 8, the "Victims' Bill of Rights,"
which, among other things, contained a "Truth-in-Evidence"
provision.'93 This provision required that in California the
exclusionary rule be interpreted in accordance with the United
States Constitution. It thereby effectively abrogated the long series
of "independent state grounds" decisions discussed above,
including Brisendine and Disbrow.
194
This rejection of the independent state grounds doctrine by the
voters did not deter the state supreme court from travelling down
this same road in areas not expressly barred by Proposition 8.
Indeed, the court displayed considerable resistance to the "Truth-
These rights already exist either in the United States Constitution or in present law. The
amendment makes them part of the California Constitution.
Id at 26 (emphasis added).
193. CAL CONST. art. 1, § 28(d). That provision states that:
Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership
in each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal
proceeding, including pretrial and post conviction motions and hearings, or in any trial or
hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense, whether heard in juvenile or adult court.
Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory rule of evidence relating to
privilege or hearsay, or Evidence Code, Sections 352,782 or 1103. Nothing in this section
shall affect any existing statutory or constitutional right of the press.
Id
194. See People v. May, 44 Cal. 3d 309, 311,748 P.2d 307, 307-08,243 Cal. Rptr. 309, 369-
70 (1988) (holding that Proposition 8 had abrogated Disbrow and other, similar cases); In re Lance
W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 879,694 P.2d 744,747,210 Cal. Rptr. 631,634 (1985) (holding that Proposition
8 abrogated the exclusionary rule cases such as Brisendine). See also Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal.
3d 236, 260-61, 651 P.2d 274, 288-89, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 44-45 (1982) (upholding the
constitutionality of Proposition 8, as a general matter).
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in-Evidence" provision even in the search and seizure area, often
avoiding its implications if possible. The court could have
demonstrated a responsive attitude to the democratic process by
adopting the federal approach mandated by Proposition 8 in this
area immediately after passage of the Proposition. Instead, in
People v. Smith,195 the court ruled that the Proposition was not
retroactive. 196 As a result the California Supreme Court was still
"developing" the now-terminal independent state grounds doctrine
in the search and seizure area for years after the passage of
Proposition 8. '97
Justice Mosk, especially, has sought to justify these continued
departures from United States Supreme Court precedent in the
name of "federalism. ' ' 9 In particular, he has in recent years
attempted to persuade "conservatives" that the independent state
grounds doctrine has something to offer them: "The conservatives'
concern over federalism and states' rights intersects--at least for the
moment--with the liberals' concern over safe-guarding individual
rights."' 99 Now, federalism is certainly one of the core values of
American democracy, and it ought to be of consequence to
everyone, regardless of one's political loyalties. But, the seductive
appeal to "federalism" in support of the independent state grounds
doctrine belies the damage that unprincipled application of that
doctrine can do to the vitality of federalism.
195. 34 Cal. 3d 251, 667 P.2d 149, 193 Cal. Rptr. 692 (1983).
196. Id. at 258, 667 P.2d at 152, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
197. See, e.g., People v. Mayoff, 42 Cal. 3d 1302, 1318 n.9, 729 P.2d 166, 176 n.9, 233 Cal.
Rptr. 2, 11 n.9 (1986); People v. Ruggles, 39 Cal. 3d 1,4,702 P.2d 170, 171,216 Cal. Rptr. 88, 89
(1985); People v. Campa, 36 Cal. 3d 870, 876, 686 P.2d 634, 636, 206 Cal. Rptr. 114, 116 (1984);
Williams v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 3d 441,449 n.6, 683 P.2d 699,704 n.6, 204 Cal. Rptr. 700,705
n.6 (1984).
198. See Mosk, State Consrirutionalism: Both Liberal and Conservative, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1081
passim (1985); Mosk, The Emerging Agenda in Stare Constitutional Rights Law, 496 ANNALS 54,
63-64 (1988).
199. State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and Conservative, supra note 198, at 1092.
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First, as Professor Earl Maltz has pointed out," ° the
independent state grounds doctrine (as used to depart from federal
precedent) is, at best, largely irrelevant and, at worst, inimical to
federalist principles. It is irrelevant because, although federalism is
implicated when a federal court preempts a state court's action, the
reverse is not the case, because of the Supremacy Clause. On the
contrary, the real issue implicated by state court activism of the
independent state grounds variety is the distribution of power
within the state government, particularly between the state judiciary
on the one hand and the state legislature and executive branches,
on the other.2"' State courts which consistently adopt federal rules
are merely deciding to give their coordinate branches of
government maximum freedom of action, by declining to subject
them to two separate systems of judicial review--federal and state--
rather than to just one, the federal courts. Furthermore, the issue of
"state autonomy," merely implies that state judges should not
mindlessly confuse the federal standard with the "floor" of their
analysis of their own state constitution: they are free to decide that
their state charter protects either more or less than does the federal
constitution. As Professor Maltz has observed:
Discussions of state autonomy have played far too large a role in state
constitutional analysis. . . . Moreover, by focusing on such
considerations, courts and commentators divert attention from the real
issues involved, issues concerning the allocation of decision-making
authority within each state's government.
2
Second, as Paul Hudnut has argued, "independent state
grounds" analysis in the area of fundamental constitutional rights
threatens the uniformity of the law between the states, a matter of
special concern in the area of constitutional criminal rights, since
200. See generally Maltz, Federalism and Maltz, The Dark Side, supra note 28.
201. This lesson is illustrated in the discussion of the tug-of-war between the Caliromia
Supreme Court and the state legislature over criminal discovery. See infra text accompanying notes
229-239.
202. Maltz, Federalism, supra note 28, at 106.
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it may lead to disparities of treatment which appear unfair or even
capricious." 3 As one California commentator warned in 1976:
In an age of ever increasing technology and mobility, the American
people may find it "curiouser and curiouser" that conceptions of their
fundamental rights should change dramatically when they merely cross
a state line. . . . [S]tate judges must avoid excessive legislative
invalidation. . . . Such cases might provoke state constitutional
amendments of an overruling nature, or amendments to restrict the state
judicial power itself.2 4
Third, inconsistent state and federal constitutional rules interfere
with the institutional cooperation of state and federal governments
upon which the functioning of a federal system depends. For
instance, law enforcement officials need to understand what rules
they are operating under. As Justice Jones of the Oregon Supreme
Court has observed: ""Federal and state law officers frequently
work together and in many instances do not know whether their
efforts will result in a federal or a state prosecution or both. In
these instances, two different rules would cause confusion.'
20 5
Thus, as federal and state law enforcement agencies have worked
more and more closely with one another in regional task forces in
recent decades, divergent state and federal laws threaten to interfere
with the effective and equitable enforcement of the law.
Finally, and most importantly, unprincipled departures from
federal precedent undermine the values and assumptions of a
common legal culture, without which federalism threatens to
become mere separatism. If ordinary people are simultaneously to
maintain their loyalty and confidence in the principled authority of
two separate jurisdictions--state and federal--under which they live,
203. Hudnut, State Constitutions, supra note 134, at 91-92.
204. Lipson, Serrano v. Priest, I and 1I: The Continuing Role of the California Supreme Court
in Deciding Questions Arising Under the California Constitution, 10 U.S.F. L. REv. 697,721 (1976).
Serrano was, of course, a civil case; but the general point applies (if anything with greater force) to
the criminal area.
205. State v. Lowry, 295 Or. 337, 346, 667 P.2d 996, 1005 (1983) (Jones, J., concurring)
(quoting State v. Florance, 270 Or. 169, 184-85, 527 P.2d 1202, 1209 (1974)), quoted in Hudnut,
State Constitutions, supra note 134, at 93.
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they must have faith that their two coordinate judiciaries are
engaged in a common enterprise, based upon shared principles
rather than divergent personalities. Where the text of a state
constitutional provision is virtually identical to the federal
counterpart, and where the constitutional history of the provision
does not support departure from federal precedent, such departures
by the state courts inevitably take on an appearance of being
"result oriented" --reflective rather of the commitments of the
majority, than of dispassionate reasoning. This is especially the
case when (as so often in California) the departure involves an
issue as fundamental and publicly visible as a constitutional right,
when little or no effort is made to justify the departure in terms of
a special state interest, and when the court is deeply split, with a
strong dissent focusing attention upon the deficiencies of the
majority opinion. The effect is to advertise the subjective and
personal aspect of judging, by pitting the conclusions of the state
court against those of the United States Supreme Court. The net
impact is to corrode federalism, rather than to promote it.
We emphasize that our concern here is with the authority and
legitimacy of the criminal judicial system, not with philosophical
debates about the "objectivity" of judging, or the insufficiency of
rules, as such, to decide "hard cases." The issue here is not "legal
realism": it is political realism, in the highest senses of those two
much-abused words. Unlike legal philosophers, judges do not exist
in abstraction from our political culture. But neither are judges just
like any other elected official or civil servant. They are, indeed,
special, in ways which both give them peculiar independence and
impose peculiar limitations upon their range and reasons for acting.
In a democracy, the former latitude can be justified only to the
extent that the latter constraints are honored. The shock of
Proposition 8, which essentially decimated a major portion of the
1256
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California Supreme Court's jurisprudence, ought to have awoken
the court to the practical realities of its constitutional obligations.
Once again, however, it was not to be. In areas not directly
implicating the exclusionary rule, the aftermath of Proposition 8
was basically "business as usual" at the state supreme court, at
least until the replacement of three justices, rejected by the voters
at the judicial retention elections of 1986. Again, a systematic
review is beyond our scope here. We will therefore use as an
exemplar one of the issues central to Proposition 115 as passed by
the voters in 1990--prosecutorial discovery. This area illustrates
many of the characteristics which we have already witnessed in the
exclusionary rule cases. One interesting difference is that the
leading case in this area, Jones v. Superior Court,06 was actually
and forthrightly based on the California Constitution. Ironically,
Jones was to be the subject of repeated restriction, and virtual
repudiation, precisely by the most ardent advocates of
"independent state grounds."
In Jones, petitioner sought relief from a trial court's order for
prosecutorial discovery. 20 7 The self-incrimination provisions of
the Fifth Amendment had not yet been incorporated into the "due
process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, so as to be
applicable to the states; therefore, a federal constitutional claim
could not be made. Furthermore, there was little governing state
legislation on this issue, since criminal discovery had been largely
a common law development by the courts. Consequently, the basis
of petitioner's claim was the "self-incrimination" clause of section
13 of the Declaration of Rights.'" Justice Traynor, for the court,
observed that "[d]iscovery is designed to ascertain the truth in
criminal as well as in civil cases.""2 9 Noting the gradual
206. 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
207. Id. at 58, 372 P.2d at 920, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
208. M,. at 60, 372 P.2d at 921, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
209. Ict at 58, 372 P.2d at 920, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 880 (citations omitted).
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expansion of discovery rights for defendants by the court, Justice
Traynor rejected the contention that this was done solely to protect
defendants' constitutional rights:
Pretrial discovery in favor of defendants... is not required by due
process. Accordingly, when this court permitted discovery in advance
of as well as at the trial, it was not acting under constitutional
compulsion but to promote the orderly ascertainment of the truth. That
procedure should not be a one-way street.
2 10
While limiting prosecutorial discovery of certain items
infringing upon attorney-client privilege, the court in large measure
approved the trial court's discovery order.
Eight years later, in Prudhomme v. Superior Court,2 ' the
court set off in a completely new direction, based explicitly upon
developments in federal law. Relying upon "certain significant
developments in the law since Jones," the court set out the
following four factors in support of its departure from Jones: (1)
The United States Supreme Court's decisions regarding the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination; (2) the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, then recently promulgated; (3) recent
lower federal court cases questioning prosecutorial discovery of
alibi witnesses; (4) and the fact that the United States Supreme
Court had just granted certiorari in Williams v. Florida,21 2 which
involved the constitutionality of such an alibi statute.21 3 On these
grounds, 214 the court narrowed Jones, while stating that "[w]e do
210. Id at 59-60, 372 P.2d at 921, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 881 (citations omitted).
211. 2 Cal. 3d 320, 466 P.2d 673, 85 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1970).
212. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
213. Prudhomme, 2 Cal. 3d at 323-25, 466 P.2d at 675-76, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 131-32.
214. The court did also quote from a California case, People v. Schader, 71 Cal. 2d 761, 457
P.2d 841, 80 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969), but the apparent point of the quoted passage was exactly to
emphasize the agreement of the California high court with the federal Supreme Court. Prudhomme,
2 Cal. 3d at 325, 466 P.2d at 676, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
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not intend to suggest that the prosecution should be barred from
any discovery in this, or any other case."
21 5
The Williams case had already been argued by the time
Prudhomme was decided: the United States Supreme Court held
that the notice-of-alibi rule did not violate the right against self-
incrimination.21 6 The lower federal court case referred to in
Prudhomme was accordingly remanded to the district court for
reconsideration in light of Williams, 217 and a notice-of-alibi
provision was added to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.2 8 Thus, the federal foundations of Prudhomme and
therefore the justification for the departure from Jones, had
evaporated.
At this point, the court began rewriting Prudhomme
retrospectively. In Reynolds v. Superior Court,219 the court was
forced to acknowledge the federal demise of prohibitions upon such
notice-of-alibi rules.22 But it was equally quick to discover a
secret state basis underlying Prudhomme:
While Williams may have laid to rest the contention that notice-of-alibi
procedures are inconsistent with the federally guaranteed privilege
against self-incrimrination, this privilege is also secured to the people of
215. Prudhomme, 2 Cal. 3d at 327, 466 P.2d at 678, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 134. The court then
explained that:
A reasonable demand for factual information which, as in Jones, pertains to a particular
defense or defenses, and seeks only that information which defendant intends to introduce
at trial, may present no substantial hazards of self-incrimination and therefore justify the
trial judge in determining that under the facts and circumstances in the case before him
it clearly appears that disclosure cannot possibly tend to incriminate defendant. However,
unless those criteria are met, discovery should be refused.
Id (footnote omitted). The court added that "'[u]ness the order is confined to information which the
defendant intends to disclose at trial, the order could also violate the attorney-client privilege, without
regard to its possible incriminatory effect. However, the defendant cannot legitimately claim the
privilege as to information which he will voluntarily disclose at trial." Id at 327 n.10, 466 P.2d at
678 n.10, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 134 n.10 (citation omitted).
216. Williams, 399 U.S. at 86.
217. Cantillon v. Superior Court, 442 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1971).
218. See FED. R. CRIm. P. 12.1 (effective December 1, 1975, by which Congress replaced the
original rule promulgated by the Supreme Court).
219. 12 Cal. 3d 834, 528 P.2d 45, 117 Cal. Rptr. 437 (1974).
220. Id at 839-41,528 P.2d at 47-49, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 439-41 (discussing then-recent United
States Supreme Court decisions regarding notice-of-alibi rules).
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California by our state Constitution, whose construction is left to this
court, informed but untrammelled by the United States Supreme Court's
reading of parallel federal provisions.... Of course, Prudhomme[]...
was in part based on this court's reading of pre-Williams federal law.
Nevertheless, it cannot be gainsaid that Prudhomme put this court on
record as being considerably more solicitous of the privilege against
self-incrimination than federal law currently requires.
221
The language quoted above is particularly rich in the "whiggish
history" which was characteristic of the California high court's
jurisprudence during this period. In the first place, Prudhomme was
not "in part based on this court's reading of pre-Williams federal
law." It was based entirely upon the court's reading of that law.
The departure from previous, and genuinely independent state law
as developed in Jones was justified precisely on federal grounds.
Second, the purported justification of Prudhomme was to make
California law neither more nor less solicitous of the privilege
against self-incrimination than was federal law; it was intended to
bring California law into accordance with federal law. Third,
hidden beneath the use of the word "currently," in the quotation
above, is the fact that the California court, in Prudhomme, just got
it wrong: as very soon interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court in Williams, the federal self-incrimination privilege did not
prevent prosecutorial discovery as the court in Prudhomme said it
did. Fourth, rather than admit this, the court made a reactionary
resort to the California Constitution. But, had the court really
desired to rely upon the California Constitution, the logical starting
point was Justice Traynor's opinion in Jones, which was expressly
so based. Instead, the court was using the state constitution as a
means for retaining its own prior interpretation of the federal rule.
Finally, exercises in "covering one's tracks," such as in Reynolds,
are just the sort of thing which has done the greatest damage to the
court's authority in the long term.
It would be premature to leave Reynolds without noting how it
prepared the way for the systematic abolition of prosecutorial
221. Id at 842-43,528 P.2d at 49-50, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 441-42 (emphasis added and footnote
omitted).
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discovery in California. The court accomplished this abolition by
acting in the name of judicial restraint--that is, by expressly
inviting the state legislature to "create" prosecutorial discovery. In
Reynolds, the court actually managed to avoid even addressing the
content of the trial court's discovery order at all, on the ground
that:
In effect, we would have to create judicially a comprehensive notice-of-
alibi procedure for California courts.
We see little to recommend our attempting at once to consider the
desirability of creating a notice-of-alibi procedure and to pass
objectively on the constitutionality of any such procedure which might
result.
222
In fact, criminal discovery (both by defense and by prosecution)
had been overwhelmingly the creation of the courts. As Justice
Traynor noted in Jones, this was accomplished by exercise of their
general rule-making powers.' Discovery was therefore an area
especially ripe for judicial rule-making in the common law
tradition. Furthermore, as the court itself notes in Reynolds, other
state courts had created such procedures by exercise of their
supervisory power over judicial procedure.224 Nonetheless, Chief
Justice Wright, who authored the court's decision declaring the
death penalty unconstitutional a couple of years earlier, invokes the
constitutional limitations of the court's proper role in government
to cut back on prosecutorial discovery by saying that the legislature
had to authorize it:
This court has not been vested with formal, quasi-legislative, rule-
making power, either by the California Constitution or the Legislature.
We accordingly conclude that due regard for this court's function as
constitutional adjudicator, and solicitude for this state's governmental
scheme of shared legislative and judicial responsibility for the sound
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222. Id at 845, 528 P.2d at 52, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 444 (footnote omitted).
223. Jones, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 58-59, 372 P.2d 919, 920-21, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879, 880-81.
224. Reynolds, 12 Cal. 3d at 848, 528 P.2d at 54, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
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administration of justice, render it inappropriate for us to create by
judicial decision a notice-of-alibi procedure for California courts.225
The death knell for prosecutorial discovery came in 1981, with
People v. Collie,226 a tour de force of judicial activism in the
guise of judicial restraint. The court, in an opinion by Justice
Mosk, "disapprove[d] of any compelled production of defense
evidence absent explicit legislative authorization' 227--and then
warned the legislature against attempting to authorize any such
thing. Using the Reynolds case to abandon the court's prior
jurisprudence, the court sent a strong message to the lower courts
to the effect that Prudhomme--previously the leading "independent
state grounds"' case in this area--had fallen into disfavor:
The theoretical disparities among the courts [of appeal] seem to arise
from the dilemma of protecting the privilege, as broadly defined by the
Prudhomme opinion, while attempting to actualize the Prudhomme
dictum which appeared to leave some avenues of prosecutorial inquiry
open. Unfortunately, the lower courts have given little or no
consideration to Reynolds ... [and] have joined in dubious battle over
an issue which, like that in Reynolds, is more appropriately left to the
Legislature for initial consideration.
228
225. Id. at 849-50, 528 P.2d at 55, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 447 (footnote omitted). Two years after
Reynolds, the court signalled the coming abolition of prosecutorial discovery in Allen v. Superior
Court, 18 Cal. 3d 520, 557 P.2d 65, 134 Cal. Rptr. 774 (1976). In that case, an order that both
prosecution and defense disclose the names of potential witnesses on the day of commencement of
trial was found to violate the California self-incrimination prevision. Id at 527, 557 P.2d at 68, 134
Cal. Rptr. 777. In its usual style, the court rewrites the history of the issue a little further by relying
upon its already rewritten prior cases:
In Reynolds we noted that "Prudhomme put this court on record as being considerably
more solicitous of the privilege against self-incrimination than federal law currently
requires." We maintain that solicitude and affirm the continued vitality of the stringent
standards set forth in Prudhomme for the protection of the privilege against self-
incrimination as embodied in article I, section 15 [of the California Constitution].
Id at 525, 557 P.2d at 67, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 776 (citation omitted). Never mind that Prudhomme,
which was a federal law case, never mentions article I, and that its primary effect was to cut back
upon Jones, which really was based upon the California provision....
226. 30 Cal. 3d 43, 634 P.2d 534, 177 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1981).
227. Id. at 48, 634 P.2d at 536, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 460.
228. Id at 53-54, 634 P.2d at 539-40, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 463-64 (footnote omitted). It is
noteworthy that the court in Collie finally re-discovers that °Prudhomme relied largely on federal
constitutional principles." Id at 51 n.2, 634 P.2d at 538 n.2, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 462 n.2. Thus, the case
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Thus, the court used federal grounds in Prudhomme to cut itself
loose from the California Constitution, as interpreted in Jones.
Then it used Reynolds to read California law back into
Prudhomme, creating an "independent state ground" by relying
upon a federally-based case. Now, it uses Collie to "conceal the
evidence" by disowning Prudhomme, while embracing Reynolds,
which had itself expressly relied upon Prudhomme. Having, itself,
in large measure created criminal discovery for defendants, and
having then extended its common law approach to prosecutorial
discovery in Jones, the court in Reynolds decided that it was
beyond its proper constitutional role to "create" a single (notice-
of-alibi) rule for prosecutorial discovery, even though a rule of
prosecutorial discovery had already been adopted in Jones.
We have seen that the court justified these restrictions upon
prosecutorial discovery by leaving this area "up to the
Legislature." This could have been a risky move, however, because
the legislature might do what it had been invited to do. So, in the
course of attempting to abolish prosecutorial discovery, Justice
Mosk in Collie, though he uses the same tack as Reynolds--that
judicial restraint requires that the task be left to legislators--also
attempts to minimize the chances that the legislature will act to
overrule Collie by warning them against it:
In recognizing the original primacy of the Legislature in the field of
creating rules of criminal procedure, [2 91 we are not unmindful of the
almost insurmountable hurdles likely to thwart any attempts to devise
constitutionally permissible discovery rules applicable to defendant or
defense material.
230
This is followed by a litany of alleged federal and state
constitutional horrors which might be found to have occurred if the
1263
upon which the court constructed its doctrine was consigned to the back bench, at least temporarily.
229. This is a pretty remarkable claim in light of all the court had done in previous years, with
regard to the death penalty, the exclusionary rule, etc.
230. Collie, 30 Cal. 3d at 54, 634 P.2d at 540, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 464 (footnote added).
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legislature were ever rash enough to venture into this area.231 As
Justice Richardson remarked in his dissent:
[L]est prosecutorial discovery actually receive legislative attention, the
majority... fearfully warns that the development of constitutionally
permissible rules faces "almost insurmountable hurdles," because the
proper standards are "'unavoidably shrouded in constitutional doubt,"
and involve "monumental complexity." The majority then cautions
"we have grave doubts that a valid discovery rule affecting criminal
defendants can be devised." The clear message to the legislature is
"It's up to you, but don't try it.
" 232
The legislature did try it. In 1982, it enacted Penal Code section
1102.5, which provided for prosecutorial discovery of statements
by defense witnesses (other than the defendant) after they had
testified on direct examination. The court, with Justice Mosk again
writing for the majority, held section 1102.5 unconstitutional in In
re Misener,233 decided three years later. We will not belabor the
argument in Misener since it follows very much in the line of the
previous cases in this area, with some historical
reinterpretations.234
In any case, Misener was less about constitutional law than it
was about constitutional power: Would control of criminal
discovery be in the hands of the legislature, or of the supreme
court? Notwithstanding its previous, abnegatory avowals of judicial
restraint in Reynolds and Collie, the court in Misener kept control
of this area of law for itself. Having found that the legislature had
"r[i]s[en] to the challenge" when it passed section 1102.5, the
231. Id at 54-55, 634 P.2d at 540-41, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 464-65.
232. Id at 66, 634 P.2d at 547, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 471 (Richardson, J., concurring and
dissenting) (citations omitted).
233. 38 Cal. 3d 543, 698 P.2d 637, 213 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1985).
234. Just to cite a couple of instances, Prudhomme once again "rests entirely on state, not
federal, grounds," id. at 558, 698 P.2d at 647,213 Cal. Rptr. at 579-whereas in Collie, "Prudhomme
relied largely on federal constitutional principles." Collie, 30 Cal. 3d at 51 n.2, 634 P.2d at 538 n.2,
177 Cal. Rptr. at 462 n.2. Also, according to the Misener majority, Reynolds held that the order in
that case "was unconstitutional under Wardius because it was not reciprocal." Misener, 38 Cal. 3d
at 549, 698 P.2d at 641,213 Cal. Rptr. at 573. Actually, Reynolds expressly declined to so hold, on
the basis that that area of law was more appropriately in the domain of the legislature. See Wardius
v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973). See also supra text accompanying notes 224-225.
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majority set about speaking "the last word on the subject," by
effectively abolishing prosecutorial discovery in California on the
grounds that it violated the self-incrimination clause of the
Declaration of Rights.235
In fact, Misener was not the last word on the subject. On the
contrary, it was itself quickly rendered virtually a dead letter. Three
of the five member majority in Misener--Chief Justice Bird, and
Justices Grodin and Reynoso--were voted out of office in 1986.
The new majority of the court quickly set about obviating the
Misener rule, by applying harmless error analysis to subsequent
cases involving section 1102.5.236 As a result, even in cases in
which the provisions of section 1102.5 were expressly applied, the
court affirmed the conviction, with the simple (if not necessarily
convincing) finding that the error had been "harmless."
Then, in 1990, the voters passed Proposition 115, which
amended article I of the Declaration of Rights to add section 30(c),
which provides that:
In order to provide for fair and speedy trials, discovery in criminal cases
shall be reciprocal in nature, as prescribed by the Legislature or by the
people through the initiative process.
237
The proposition also added statutory provisions to implement
this system of "reciprocal discovery." In August, 1991, in Izazaga
v. Superior Court,38 the California Supreme Court (in an opinion
authored by the Chief Justice) held "that, . . . the discovery
provisions of Proposition 115 are valid under the state and federal
Constitutions, and that Proposition 115 effectively reopened the
two-way street of reciprocal discovery in criminal cases in
235. Misener, 38 Cal. 3d at 558, 698 P.2d at 648, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
236. See People v. Wright, 52 Cal. 3d 367,421-22, 802 P.2d 221,256-57,276 Cal. Rptr. 731,
766-67 (1990); People v. Hunter, 49 Cal. 3d 957, 970, 782 P.2d 608, 614, 264 Cal. Rptr. 367, 373
(1989); People v. Robbins, 45 Cal. 3d 867, 882,755 P.2d 355,364, 248 Cal. Rptr. 172, 180 (1988)
(finding any Misener error to be harmless). See also People v. Rich, 45 Cal. 3d 1036, 1086-87, 755
P.2d 960, 991-92, 248 Cal. Rptr. 510, 541-42 (1988) (finding no Misener error).
237. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 30(c).
238. 54 Cal. 3d 356, 815 P.2d 304, 285 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1991).
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California. ' 239 Although the court did not acknowledge the fact,
this decision essentially abrogated the whole line of cases from
Prudhomme to Misener. Justice Mosk, having been the author of
many of the opinions which were so abrogated, lodged a long
dissent.
In sum, as of this writing, the jurisprudence of "independent
state grounds," as developed by the California Supreme Court
beginning in the early 1970's and continued aggressively until at
least January of 1987, lies in shards. Meanwhile, what one scholar
has referred to as "amendomania ' ' 24 has been loosed upon the
land. Given the considerable damage this whole experience has
inflicted upon our state's judiciary and other institutions, one ought
at least to attempt to salvage some positive lessons from this
journey of the last two decades.
CONCLUSION: A CAUTIONARY TALE
The role of the judiciary--and, especially, of appellate judges--
in a democracy is difficult and profoundly ambivalent: Judges must
be politic, without succumbing to politics; they must be principled
without being driven by merely personal principles; they must root
their opinions in history--real history--without themselves
becoming its slaves. Above all, they must not be "result oriented,"
but they must be acutely oriented to the Great Result of their
endeavor--the protection and strengthening of democratic
government and its institutions of justice. As the late Professor
Alexander Bickel observed (speaking of the United States Supreme
Court) in his final book, The Morality of Consent:
[J]udges, themselves abstracted from, removed from political institutions
by several orders of magnitude, ought never to impose an answer on the
society merely because it seems prudent and wise to them personally,
or because they believe that an answer -- always provisional -- arrived
at by the political institutions is foolish....
239. Id at 363, 815 P.2d at 308, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
240. See Wilkes, First Things Last: Amendomania and State Bills of Rights, 54 Miss. L.J. 223
(1984).
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Yet in the end, and even if infrequently, we do expect the Court to give
us principle.... Confined to a profession, the explication of principle
is disciplined, imposing standards of analytical candor, rigor, and clarity.
The Court is to reason, not feel, to explain and justify principles it
pronounces to the last possible rational decimal point. It may not itself
generate values, out of the stomach, but must seek to relate them -- at
least analogically -- to judgments of history and moral philosophy.
24 1
Taken together, the disciplined "explication of principle" and
the accompanying moral authority of its decisions are the blood
and sinews of the judiciary--and therefore of our legal system. If
courts fail in these tasks--or even if the great body of opinion in
the community concludes that they have failed--the results can be
as destructive as they are insidious: the incremental undermining
and weakening of government by law, and the corrosion of the
ability of the judiciary to persuade and of its moral authority to
cajole. "Possessed of neither the purse nor the sword, the power
and influence of.... [a] Court are in direct proportion to the
respect which its decisions command."242
Too often in recent decades, these values have been depreciated
and consequently diminished by our California Supreme Court.
Sometimes, as in the Hawkins case, this was done more or less
expressly: the text, origins, subsequent history, and present political
realities were ignored in a manner such as few elected officials
would have dared contemplate. Other times, as in Anderson, the
court would make incomplete or unconvincing ventures into textual
and historical analysis, only to reach textually and historically
insupportable conclusions. But most often, as in the independent
state grounds cases (such as in Brisendine and Reynolds) discussed
above, the court embraced an obsolete federal doctrine and justified
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241. A. BICKm., supra note 145, at 26.
242. In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921,946,569 P.2d 1286,1302,141 Cal. Rptr. 298, 314 (1977)
(Clark, J., dissenting) (attributing this language to "the Attorney General").
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this departure from applicable federal law243 as an "independent"
interpretation of a provision of the California Constitution--which
provision was almost always virtually identical to the parallel
provision of the federal constitution. Because the language of the
state and federal provisions was so similar, efforts to justify these
"independent" interpretations based on the text itself were doomed
from the outset. Moreover, efforts--such as in Disbrow or in
Houston--to justify these "independent" doctrines historically
were, as we discuss above in Part I, erroneous. On this foundation
of sand, the court would then build an edifice of its own, largely
constructed from misreadings of its own past jurisprudence. Rarely
do these cases manifest any sensitivity to the political
circumstances surrounding them; still less do they demonstrate that
the court was seeking to respond to the concerns of Californians
generally.
Over a decade ago, Professor Preble Stolz of the Boalt Hall
Law School concluded his book, Judging Judges, regarding the
controversies then swirling around the California high court, with
the following, prescient observations:
Recognizing that judicial power is always threatened by some exercise
of majoritarian power is debilitating only if the justices believe they
have a mandate to govern by virtue of their office. Phrased differently,
trimming is a problem only if there is a program to be diluted. If the
court has no program beyond fair process and if its fundamental
principle is to do its best to understand, articulate, and promote the
policy preferences of others, then judicial power should endure despite
the ambiguities inherent in the justices' high office.
Ultimately the issue is whether the California justices are willing to
accept this limited vision of their function.
24 4
243. This is not to deny that there were some instances in which the federal High Court
provoked such resistance from other courts, by departing from its own prior jurisprudence with
insufficient circumspection. But that is another subject.
244. P. STOLZ, JUDGING JUDGES: THE INVESTIGATION O ROSE BIRD AND THE CALIFORNIA
SUPREME COURT 427 (198 1).
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Professor Stolz published these words in 1981, in the wake of
the voters' rejection of the Anderson decision, the narrow victory
of then-Chief Justice Rose Bird in the judicial retention election of
1978, and the subsequent, bruising public inquiry into alleged
wrong-doings in connection with that election.245 Unfortunately,
the court as a whole did not take Professor Stolz's counsel to heart.
It continued to act in the imperial mode, and the people of this
state have responded accordingly. Proposition 8 wiped out a major
portion of the court's criminal jurisprudence. Then, the voters
turned out almost half of the court in the elections of 1986. This
was followed in 1990 by Proposition 115, which amounted to an
extraordinary vote of lack of confidence in the court. Section 24 of
Proposition 115 would have essentially gutted the remainder of the
court's constitutional authority over criminal procedure.
As noted above, the court avoided this result by ruling in Raven
v. Deukmejian that section 24 amounted to an invalid "revision"
of the state constitution. However, the court in Raven also made a
salutary departure from the practice of the "independent state
grounds" era. It relied upon a genuinely unique provision of the
California Constitution which it read to mean more or less what it
said. 46 Furthermore, it has not resisted Proposition 115 as it did
Proposition 8.247 So, it may be that the court has rounded the
corner. If true, we may look forward to a period of healing and
general reconstruction of the bond between the court and the
people of this state.
There can be no better or more important place to start such a
reconstruction than with the California Declaration of Rights. But
the starting point for the development of a genuinely
"independent" and "vital" Declaration must be the understanding
of and respect for the text and history of that document. This in
turn requires a mature appreciation that there are provisions which
are emphatically unique, or at least non-federal in origin and intent,
245. Id. passim.
246. Raven v. Deukrnejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 349-50, 801 P.2d 1077, 1085-86, 276 Cal. Rptr.
326, 334-35 (1990) (citing CAL- CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1-3).
247. See, e.g., Tapia v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 3d 282,299, 807 P.2d 434,444,279 Cal. Rptr.
592, 602-03 (1991) (holding Proposition 115 to be generally retroactive).
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but that there are also provisions--especially the criminal procedure
provisions--which definitely are not independent of the federal
Model. As we have shown in Part I above, the latter were
consciously taken from the federal constitution and were
incorporated into our state Declaration in order to secure those
federal rights for Californians. Furthermore, if anything positive is
to emerge from the events of the past couple of decades discussed
in Part II, it ought to be an appreciation that the people of this state
wish to see those provisions interpreted, as a general matter, in a
manner which reflects their origins: that is, federally. If the text
and history of a provision are federal, then taking that text and
history seriously--and in a manner that ordinary people can
understand--means regarding the precedents of the United States
Supreme Court as persuasive authority. In the words of Justice
Richardson:
"The interests of uniformity in the development of basic principles of
constitutional law involving ... rights which are expressed in identical
terms in state and federal constitutions, together with the deference that
is due the pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the United States,
indicate that we should chart a separate course only where compelling
reasons for doing so are advanced."
248
On the other hand, with regard to provisions which are unique
to the California Constitution, or which come from other states,
etc., it is all the more important that the California Supreme Court
(and lower courts interpreting such provisions) carefully anchor
their interpretations in the text and history of those provisions. This
requires close reading of the text and doing the scholarship
necessary to recover the text's "usable past," in accordance with
long-standing traditions of legal interpretation. The result of this
inquiry may be that the California provision is either broader, or
narrower, than the protection provided by federal law--or, it may
be broader in some respects and narrower in others. Whatever the
248. People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 129, 545 P.2d 272, 291, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 379
(emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted in original) (quoting Justie Pomeroy of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Triplett, 462 Pa. 244, 341 A.2d 62 (1975)).
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results of this inquiry, the court's guiding principle in developing
the Declaration should be first of all to do no harm to the
democratic process of this state. On this basis the California
Declaration of Rights can become the generator of consensus and
the foundation for a genuinely vital and independent state
constitutional jurisprudence.
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ThE PROVENANCEa AND FATE OF TME PROVISIONS OF
Text of the 1849 Declaration ' Provenance
Sec. 1. All men are by nature free and
independent, and have certain inalienable
rights, among which are those of enjoying
and defending life and liberty: acquiring,
possessing and protecting property: and
pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.
Sec. 2. [1] All political power is inherent in
the people. [2] Government is instituted for
the protection, security and benefit of the
people; and they have the right to alter or
reform the same, whenever the public good
may require it.
I1) The Iowa Constitution of 1846, art. I, §
1.
12) The Iowa Constitution of 1846, art. 1, §
2, with a change reflected in the manuscript
of the Original California Constitution. (This
change consisted of the elimination of the
words "at all times," after "right" in clause
[21.)d
a. By provenance, we emphasize that we are not speaking of the ultimate origins of the
language of the various provisions. See supra note 7. Rather, we are concerned with those documents
from which the language in question was, in all likelihood, consciously adopted or adapted. Those
interested in state constitutions with provisions similar to those of California (at least as regards the
1879 constitution) are referred, as a starting point, to DEsTY, supra, note 12, passim.
b. The text reproduced below is that from the facsimile draft of TH ORIGiNAL
CONSTITUTION. See supra, at note 30. The clause designations placed in brackets are for purposes
of convenience only.
C. As with many other civil law provisions, the general language of this section was common
to other state constitutions. See, e.g., MAiNE CONST. 1820, art. I, § 1; FLA. CONST., 1838, art. I, §
1; and especially the Virginia Bill of Rights, 1776, § 1.
d. This language was also common to state constitutions of the time. See, e.g., CONN.
CONST., 1818, art. I, § 2; MICH. CONsT., 1835, art. I, § 2; see also, MAss. CoNST., 1780, Part I, art.
I.
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THE CALIFORNIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF 1849
Subsequent History
/1] Remains § 1 of the present Declaration,
except that "and privacy" was added by
popular initiative in 1972.
(2) This section remains essentially the
same, except that in 1976 it was moved to
art II, § 1.
Parallel Language in the Present (1992)
Declaration!
(I] All people are by nature free and
independent and have inalienable rights.
Among these are enjoying and defending life
and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and
protecting property, and pursuing and
obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.
[present § 1]
(21 All political power is inherent in the
people. Government is instituted for their
protection, security, and benefit, and they
have the right to alter or reform it when the
public good may require. [present art. I, §
11
e. Unless otherwise noted, the bracketed references to the present section of the California
Constitution are to article I, the Declaration of Rights. Because considerable changes were made to
sections 3 and 8 of the 1849 Declaration at the constitutional convention of 1878-1879, we also
reproduce below the language in the present Declaration which derive from the changes made to the
Declaration in 1879.
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Text of the 1849 Declaration
Sec. 3. fla] The right of trial by jury shall
be secured to all, [Ib] and remain inviolate
forever, [2] but a jury trial may be waived
by the parties, in all civil cases, in the
manner to be prescribed by law.
Sec. 4. [1] The free exercise and enjoyment
of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed in this state: [2] and no person shall
be rendered incompetent to be a witness on
account of his opinions on matters of
religious belief; [3] but the liberty of
conscience, hereby secured, shall not be so
construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness,
or justify practices inconsistent with the
peace or safety of this state.
Sec. 5. The privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall not be suspended, unless when,
in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public
safety may require its suspension.
[31 Te origin of clause fla] is unknown
and may be original to California Clauses
[ibf and [2] are from the New York
Constitution of 1846, article I, § 2.
(4) The section comes from the 1846 N.Y.
Constitution, art. I, § 3, with a deletion (of
the words "to all mankind" after "state" in
clause [1]) reflected in the Original CaL
Constitution; clauses [1] and [3] were taken
from the N.Y. Constitution of 1777 via art.
VII, § 3 of the N.Y. Constitution of 1821.
(5) The drafters worked from art. I, § 4 of
the N.Y. Constitution of 1846, taken from art.
VII, § 6 of the 1821 N.Y. Constitution; but
the archetype for the section was the U.S.
Constitution, art. I, § 912].
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L The "inviolate" right to trial by jury was often guaranteed by 19th century state
constitutions. See, e.g., ALA. CONST., 1819, Art.I, § 28; ILL. CoNST., 1818, Art. VIII, § 6.
g. See supra part I.D.3.
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Subsequent History
(3] This section was the subject of
considerable controversy at the convention of
18 78-18 79 .' As a result, clause [2] of the
1849 Declaration was replaced in § 7 of the
1879 Declaration with the following: "but in
civil actions three fourths of the jury may
render a verdict A trial by jury may be
waived in all criminal cases, not amounting
to felony, by the consent of both parties,
expressed in open Court, and in civil actions
by the consent of the parties, signified in
such manner as may be prescribed by law.
In civil actions, and cases of misdemeanor,
the jury may consist of twelve, or of any
number less than twelve upon which the
parties may agree in open Court" (Clauses
[la] and [ib] remain today with stylistic
changes.) It was amended in lesser respects
in 1928, again in 1974, and once again in
1980.
(4/ Remains § 4 of the present Declaration;
in 1879, "allowed" was changed to
"guaranteed" in clause [1] and "or juror"
was added after "witness" in clause [2]; in
1974, stylistic changes reorganized the
section somewhaL
(5] Except that it is now § 11 of the
Declaration, this section remains the same,
with stylistic changes made in 1974.
Parallel Language in the Present (1992)
Declaration
131 Trial by jury is an inviolate right and
shall be secured to all, but in a civil cause
three-fourths of the jury may render a
verdict. A jury may be waived in a criminal
cause by the consent of both parties
expressed in open court by the defendant and
defendant's counsel. In a civil cause a jury
may be waived by the consent of the parties
expressed as prescribed by statute. [1] In
civil causes the jury shall consist of 12
persons or a lesser number agreed on by the
parties in open court. In civil causes in
municipal or justice court the Legislature
may provide that the jury shall consist of
eight persons or a lesser number agreed on
by the parties in open court. fl] In criminal
actions in which a felony is charged, the jury
shall consist of 12 persons. In criminal
actions in which a misdemeanor is charged,
the jury shall consist of 12 persons or a
lesser number agreed on by the parties in
open court. [present § 16]
(4) Free exercise and enjoyment of religion
without discrimination or preference are
guaranteed. This liberty of conscience does
not excuse acts that are licentious or
inconsistent with the peace or safety of the
State. The Legislature shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion. [1]
A person is not incompetent to be a witness
or juror because of his or her opinions on
religious beliefs. [present § 4]
[5) Habeas corpus may not be suspended
unless required by public safety in cases of
rebellion or invasion. [present § 111
h. See supra part I.E.I.
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Text of the 1849 Declaration
Sec. 6. (Ia] Excessive bail shall not be
required, [b] nor excessive fines imposed,
[2] nor shall cruel or unusual punishments
be inflicted, [3] nor shall witnesses be
unreasonably detained.
Sec. Z All persons shall be bailable, by
sufficient sureties: unless for capital offenses,
when the proof is evident or the presumption
great.
[61 Clauses [1] through 13] are from the
N.Y. Constitution of 1846, art. I, § 5, with
one emendation in the original California
Constitution'; but the archetype of clauses
[1] and [2] was the U.S. Constitution,
AmenL Vill.
(71 The exemplar was the Iowa Constitution
of 1846, art I, § 12[21, except that "before
conviction" was removed after "shall," and
"when" substituted for "where." That
language in turn comes from the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787, a. 11.
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(61 §4 6 and 7 of the 1849 Declaration were
combined in section 6 of the Declaration of
the 1879 constitution. The language taken
from § 6 of the 1849 document was also
amended to add, "nor confined in any room
where criminals are actually imprisoned,"
after "detained, " In 1974, this added phrase
was removed on grounds of obsolescence. At
the same time, the clauses originally
embodied in § 6 of the 1849 Declaration
were split up into several different sections,
as reflected in the column at right
(7/ §§ 6 and 7 of the 1849 Declaration were
combined in § 6 of the Declaration of the
1879 Constitution. The language taken from
§ 7 was taken over verbatim and remains
with only stylistic changes in § 12(a).
However, in 1982, § 12(b) and (c) were
added by popular initiative, the effect of
which was to further limit the availability of
bail in cases where there is "clear and
convincing evidence" of a "substantial
likelihood" of bodily harm to others. This
1982 amendment effectively overruled the
California Supreme Court's decision in In re
Underwood, 9 Cal, 3d 345, 508 P.2d 721,
107 CaL Rptr. 401 (1973).
Parallel Language in the Present (1992)
Declaration
(6) Excessive bail may not be required.
[present § 12, 12)
Cruel or unusual punishment may not be
intlicted or excessive fines imposed. [present
f171
Witnesses may not be unreasonably
detained. [present § 10[111
17) A person shall be released on bail by
sufficient sureties, except for (a) Capital
crimes when the facts are evident or the
presumption great .... [present § 12(a)]
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Sec. & [1] No person shall be held to
answer for a capital or otherwise infamous
crime 12] (except in cases of impeachment,
and in cases of militia when in actual
service, and the land and naval forces in time
of war, or which this state may keep with the
consent of Congress in time of peace, and in
cases of petit larceny under the regulation of
the legislature) [3) unless on presentment or
indictment of a grand jury; [4] and in any
trial in any court whatever, the party accused
shall be allowed to appear and defend in
person and with counsel, as in civil actions.
[51 No person shall be subject to be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offence; 16] nor
shall he be compelled, in any criminal case,
to be a witness against himself, 17] nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; [8] nor shall private
property be taken for public use without just
compensation.
18) The N.Y. Constitution of 1846, art. I, §
6; clause [4) was taken largely from the N.Y.
Constitution of 1821, art. VII, § 7; but, the
archetype of clauses [1], [3] and [5)
through 18] was the U.S. Constitution,
Amend. V.
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[81 As a result of the controversy over the
grand jury system, the convention of 1878-
1879 replaced clauses [1] through [3] of the
1849 Declaration with the following
language in hew § 8 of the 1879
Declaration, set forth in the margin.' Clause
[8] was moved to § 14 in 1879. The
remaining language from § 8 (clauses [4]
through [7]) of the 1849 Declaration was
moved to § 13 of the 1879 document, and
new language guaranteeing a speedy and
public trial and providing for witness
depositions was added.' § 13 of the 1879
Declaration is set forth in the margin.' The
eminent domain clause was moved and
amended several times between 1879 and the
present.
Parallel Language in the Present (1992)
Declaration
(8) The defendant in a criminal cause has
the right to a speedy public trial, to compel
attendance of witnesses in the defendant's
behalf, to have the assistance of counsel for
the defendant's defense, to be personally
present with counsel, and to be confronted
with the witnesses against the defendant. The
Legislature may provide for the deposition of
a witness in the presence of the defendant
and the defendant's counsel. [ ] Persons may
not twice be put in jeopardy for the same
offense, be compelled in a criminal cause to
be a witness against themselves, or be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law. [present § 15]
A person may not be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of
law.... [from present § 7]
Private property may be taken or
damaged for public use only when just
compensation, ascertained by a jury unless
waived, has first been paid to, or into court
for, the owner.... [from present § 19]
j. See supra part I.E.2.
k. Section 8 of the 1879 Declaration read: "Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by
indictment shall be prosecuted by information, after examination and commitment by a magistrate,
or by indictment, with or without such examination and commitment, as may be prescribed by law.
A grand jury shall be drawn and summoned at least once a year in each county."
1. See supra Part I.D.I.
m. Section 13 of the 1879 Declaration read: "In criminal prosecutions, in any Court whatever,
the party accused shall have the right to a speedy and public trial; to have the process of the Court
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf, and to appear and defend, in person and with
counsel. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense; nor be compelled, in any
criminal case, to be a witness against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law. The Legislature shall have power to provide for the taking, in the presence of the
party accused and his counsel, of depositions of witnesses in criminal cases, other than cases of
homicide, when there is reason to believe that the witness, from inability or other causes, will not
attend at the trial."
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Sec. 9. [1] Every citizen may freely speak,
write and publish his sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of
that right; [2] and no law shall be passed to
restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of
the press. [3] In all criminal prosecutions on
indictments for libels, the truth may be given
in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear
to the jury that the matter charged as
libellous is true, and was published with
good motives and for justifiable ends, the
party shall be acquitted: and the jury shall
have the right to determine the law and the
fact.
Sec. 10. The people shall have the right
freely to assemble together, to consult for the
common good, to instruct their
representatives, and to petition the legislature
for redress of grievances.
Sec. 11. All laws of a general nature shall
have a uniform operation.
Sec. 12. [1] The military shall be
subordinate to the civil power. [2] No
standing army shall be kept up by this state
in time of peace; [3] and in time of war no
appropriation for a standing army shall be
for a longer time than two years.
Sec. 13. No soldier shall, in time of peace,
be quartered in any house, without the
consent of the owner;, nor in time of war,
except in the manner to be prescribed by
law.
(9) The N.Y. Constitution of 1846, art. I, § 8,
which was taken from the MY. Constitution
of 1821, art. VII, § &
110] The Iowa Constitution of 1846, art. I, §
20, with a few emendations.
[11) The Iowa Constitution of 1846, art. 1, §
6.
{12] With a single stylistic exception, this
comes in haec verba from the Iowa
Constitution of 1846 art. I, § 14.
(131 This section comes in haec verba from
the Iowa Constitution of 1846, art. I, § 15.
(Similarity of language suggests that the
archetype for the language was the U.S.
Constitution, Amend. III).
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191 The language of§ 9 was retained in the
1879 Declaration, with some additional
language providing for venue in libel cases.
This language in turn remained substantially
unchanged until the revisions of 1974. At
that time, clauses [1] and [2] (from the 1849
Declaration) were left unchanged, except
that "citizen" was changed to "person." (The
Revision Commission also removed the
language of clause [3], on the grounds that
its specificity made it more appropriate for
statutory embodiment)
(10/ Embodied in § 3 of the present
Declaration, with stylistic changes made in
1974.
(111 The language of this section remains
essentially unchanged, except that it is now
embodied in art. IV § 16(a).
(121 The language of§§ 12 and 13 of the
1849 Declaration was combined in § 12 of
the Declaration in the Constitution of 1879,
except that the language of clause [3] of§
12 of the 1849 document was eliminated. As
consolidated in the 1879 Declaration, the
language remains today essentially
unchanged; it is now set forth in § 5 of the
present Declaration.
(13/ The language of§ 13 of the 1849
Declaration was combined with mosrt of the
language from § 12, into § 12 of the
Declaration in the Constitution of 1879. That
language, now set forth in § 5, remains
essentially unchanged.
Parallel Language in the Present (1992)
Declaration
(91 Every person may freely speak, write and
publish his or her sentiments on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of this right.
A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of
speech or press. [present § 2(a)]
/10/ The people have the right to instruct
their representatives, petition government for
redress of grievances, and assemble freely to
consult for the common good. [present § 3]
(111 All laws of a general nature have
uniform operation. [present art. IV, § 16(a)]
(12/ The military is subordinate to civil
power. A standing army may not be
maintained in peacetime. [present § 5[111
[13] Soldiers may not be quartered in any
house in wartime except as prescribed by
law, or in peacetime without the owner's
consent. [present § 5[2]]
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Sec. 14. Representation shall be apportioned
according to population.
Sec. 15. No person shall be imprisoned for
debt, in any civil action on mesne or final
process, unless in cases of fraud: and no
person shall be imprisoned for a militia fre
in time of peace.
Sec. 16. No bill of attainder, ex post facto
law, or law impairing the obligation of
contracts, shall ever be passed.
Sec. 1Z Foreigners who are, or who may
hereafter become, bonafide residents of this
state, shall enjoy the same rights in respect
to the possession, enjoyment and inheritance
of property, as native born citizens.
Sec. 1& Neither slavery, nor involuntary
servitude, unless for the punishment of
crimes, shall ever be tolerated in this state.
[14) The provenance of this section, simple
though it may be, is unknown; it may be
original to the California Constitution"
(15) With a minor stylistic exception, this
comes in haec verba from the Iowa
Constitution of 1846, art. I, § 19.
116) The ostensible source was the Iowa
Constitution of 1846, art. I, § 21; but, the
archetype was the U.S. Constitution, art. 1,
§§ 9[3] and 1011].*
(17) This section comes from the Iowa
Constitution, art. I, § 22, with some
emendations: "bona fide" was inserted before
"residents," and "inheritance" was
substituted for "descent."
[181 The Iowa Constitution of 1846, art. I, §
23; but the archetype for that language was
the federal Northwest Ordinance of 1787,
art. Wl.
n. Professor Fritz, supra at note 13, at 24, has cited as the source of this provision the Iowa
Constitution of 1846, but no such language appears in that document. More interesting is the
suggestion by Hansen in SEARCH FOR AUTHoRrTY, supra note 64, at 113, who points to the Mexican
Acta Constitutiva of 1823-24, which certainly may have been familiar to the Spanish-speaking
"Californians" of the constitutional delegation. The general concept of representation according to
population does appear in the Acta Constitutiva. See COECCION DE LAS LEYBS FUNDAMENTALES
(1857) at 118 (art. 12 under "Poder legislativo") and F.T. RAMIREZ, LEYEs FUNDAMENTALES DE
MEXICO, 1808-1975 (1975) at 155 (same); however, comparison of the language of the Acts
Constitutiva with that of the official, Spanish translation of the 1849 constitution reveals almost no
similarity of wording. So, although some general inspiration may come from the Acre Constitutiva,
it cannot be said that the language of the California 1849 Constitution was adopted from the Acta
Constitutiva. See THE ORGoINAL CONSTITUON, supra, note 30 at 15 (containing the Spanish version
of the relevant language from the 1849 constitution).
0. See supra part I.D.4.
1282
Provenance
1992 / Use and Abuse of the California Declaration of Rights
Subsequent History
(14) This section was apparently abolished
by the convention of 1879, and so there is no
direct successor to it
1151 In 1879, the following language was
added after 7fraud" "nor in civil actions for
torts, except in cases of wilful injury to
person or property...." The present
language was adopted in 1974.
(16) Embodied in f 9 of the present
Declaration, with stylistic changes made in
1974.
(17) This section has had an evenful and
disturbing history. In 1879, the section was
amended so as to discriminate against
persons of Asian origin! The section was
amended again in 1894 and yet again in
1954. The latter amendment removed
language expressly addressed to race but
retained disabilities applicable to foreigners.
The present language, adopted in the
revision of 1974 is the simplest and most
expansive in the section's history.
(18/ Embodied in § 6 of the present
Declaration, with stylistic changes made in
1974.
Parallel Lanauaae in the Present (1992)
Declaration
(15) A person may not be imprisoned in a
civil action for debt or tort, or in peacetime
for a militia fine. [present § 10[2)]
(16) A bill of attainder, cx post facto law, or
law impairing the obligation of contracts
may not be passed. [present § 9]
(17/ Noncitizens have the same property
rights as citizens. [present § 20]
(18) Slavery is prohibited. Involuntary
servitude is prohibited except to punish
crime. [present § 6]
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p. See Scheiber, Race, Radicalism, and Reform: Historical Perspective on the 1879
California Constitution, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 35 (1989).
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Sec. 19. The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable seizures and searches,
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue but on probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly describing
the places to be searched, and the persons
and things to be seized.
Sec. 20. Treason against the state shall
consist only in levying war against it,
adhering to its enemies, or giving them aid
and comfort. No person shall be convicted of
treason, unless on the evidence of two
witnesses to the same overt act, or
confession in open court.
Sec. 21. This enumeration of rights shall not
be construed to impair or deny others,
retained by the people.
(19) The ostensible source was the Iowa
Constitution of 1846, art. 1, § 8; but, the
archetype was the U.S. Constitution, Amend.
Iv.q
(20) The ostensible source was the Iowa
Constitution of 1846, art. 1, § 16: the
archetype was the U.S. Constitution, art. 111,
§ 3[1.'
(211 This section comes in haec verba from
the Iowa Constitution of 1846, art. 1, § 25.
q. See supra part I.D.2.
r. See supra part I.D.6.
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(19) Embodied in § 13 of the present
Declaration, with stylistic changes made in
1974.
(20) Embodied in § 18 of the present
Declaration, with stylistic changes made in
1974.
(211 Embodied in the last clause of § 24 of
the present Declaration, with stylistic
changes made in 1974.
Parallel Lanauaee in the Present (1992)
Declaration
(19) The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable seizures and searches
may not be violated; and a warrant may not
issue except on probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons and
things to be seized. [present § 13]
[20) Treason against the State consists only
in levying war against it, adhering to its
enemies, or giving them aid and comfort. A
person may not be convicted of treason
except on the evidence of two witnesses to
the same overt act or by confession in open
court. [present § 18]
121) This declaration of rights may not be
construed to impair or deny others retained
by the people. [present § 24, last clause]
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